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FOREWORD
To win on today’s complex and competitive battlefield our military leaders have had to try to shed
decades of organizational culture that emphasized
control and stability as the solution to solving problem sets. Instead, today’s leaders must be adaptive
and agile in their analysis and development of innovative solutions to the complex challenges of the
21st century. Today’s security environment requires
men and women in uniform to think critically and be
creative in developing new strategies and solutions.
These skills will allow our military leaders to maintain
the operational initiative against an enemy who is by
nature adaptive and always evolving to overcome the
tremendous advantage in technological and material
overmatch of the United States and many of its allies.
This paper argues that the U.S. Army should continue its bold initiatives in its current Campaign of
Learning and go even further. It should develop creative leaders who can exercise adaptive leadership
with the capacity to provide learning environments
within their organizations. Included in the paper is
an analysis of adaptive challenges facing the Army.
Specifically, the Army espouses the need for decentralized operations and operational adaptability, but
the author argues that the Army culture is driven by
control, stability, and risk aversion.
A case study provides a means for analyzing the
complexity of organizational leadership in the contemporary security environment. The study presents
a high-stakes problem set requiring an operational
adaptation by a cavalry squadron in Baghdad, Iraq.
This problematic reality triggers the struggle in finding a creative solution, as cultural norms serve as bar-
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riers against overturning accepted solutions that have
proven successful in the past, even if they do not fit
today’s reality. The case highlights leaders who are
constrained by assumptions and therefore suffer the
consequences of failing to adapt quickly to a changed
environment. Emphasizing the importance of reflection and a willingness to experiment and assume risk,
the case study transitions to an example of a successful application of adaptive leadership and adaptive
work performed by the organization.
The case study serves as a microcosm of the challenges facing the U.S. Army. The corresponding leadership framework presented can be used as a model
for the Army as it attempts to move forward in its efforts to make adaptation an institutional imperative
(Chapters 1 and 2). The paper presents a holistic approach to leadership, whereby the leader transcends
being simply an authority figure and becomes instead
a real leader who provides a safe and creative learning
environment for the organization to tackle and solve
adaptive challenges (Chapter 3). The paper concludes
with a recommendation that Army leaders apply Harvard Professor Dean Williams’s theory of leadership
to the challenges confronting the Army’s leader development process so as to improve its efforts to grow
adaptive leaders (Chapter 4).
		

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
		 Director
		
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Former Army Chief of Staff General Martin E.
Dempsey has highlighted “failure of imagination” as
a major obstacle in an organization’s ability to learn,
adapt, and find solutions to complex problems. As a
former Commanding General of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General
Dempsey led the redesign of the Army’s conceptual
foundation. He and other Army officials, reflecting on
the previous decade’s conflicts, aggressively instituted a campaign of learning, which TRADOC describes
as “a broad set of initiatives designed to produce an
Army capable of rapidly adapting to defeat unforeseen threats.”
This paper argues that the U.S. Army should continue its bold initiatives and go even further. It should
develop creative leaders who can exercise adaptive
leadership with the capacity to provide learning environments within their organizations. Included in
the paper is an analysis of adaptive challenges facing
the Army. Specifically, the Army espouses the need
for decentralized operations and operational adaptability, but the Army culture is driven by control,
stability, and risk aversion. The author provides a recommended solution for overcoming this disconnect
and achieving adaptive leadership through the application of a leadership framework provided by Dean
Williams of Harvard’s Kennedy School. The focus of
“real leadership” as presented by Williams is not to
get others to follow, but rather is directed toward getting people to confront reality and change their values, habits, practices, and priorities to deal with the
real threat or opportunity the group faces. It is through
this more holistic approach to leadership that the
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Army can maximize the adaptations in its campaign
of learning and develop leaders with the capacity and
skills to foster learning environments within their organizations.
In many cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, however,
the Army is getting it right. Junior leaders, routinely
exercising adaptive leadership, demonstrate numerous examples of how to overcome intractable challenges in changing and ambiguous environments. In
these cases, commanders are leading their organizations through complex realities by assuming necessary
risk and seizing the initiative from our adversaries.
These examples of a more creative approach to problem-solving based on mutual trust inside of the organizations ensures that these units achieve and maintain momentum over the enemy, which is necessary
to progress successfully in the fight against adaptive
opponents in the current operational environment.
Unfortunately, the discretion and flexibility granted to many leaders in these theaters of war is not how
business is done on a day-to-day basis throughout the
U.S. Army. What is at stake if we do not incorporate
these battlefield lessons into the organization’s DNA
will be a lower likelihood that the Army will produce
the quantity and quality of leaders who are creative,
imaginative, and innovative, and can lead learning organizations on today’s competitive battlefield. It is the
risk of operating at 80-percent effectiveness as an organization when 90 percent or better can be achieved
with cultural alignment between what the Army says
is important and what it actually rewards as success
through professional advancement. The Army is at a
pivotal juncture as it attempts to transition over the
next decade from war in two major theaters back to a
traditional garrison routine in the context of persistent
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global conflict. Its ability to institute an organizational
change in culture that can produce operational adaptability is critical to successfully moving the Army
toward making adaptive leadership the way it does
business.
This paper begins with a case study that provides
an example of a real-world adaptive challenge during
a cavalry squadron’s recent deployment to Baghdad
in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The case
study accentuates the challenges of organizational
leadership in complex environments and the consequences of failing to adapt fast enough on today’s
battlefields. Ultimately, the unit makes in-stride adaptations, demonstrating how the exercise of adaptive
leadership must start with a reflective diagnosis and
an accurate understanding of the adaptive challenge.
It highlights the role of the leader in presenting the
reality of the changed conditions to the organization,
and then providing a learning environment based on
trust and empowerment to allow the group to develop
adaptive solutions. Simply put, the case study confirms the requirement for operational adaptability to
become “how we do business” in the security environment of the 21st century.
Following the case study, evidence is presented
that suggests there is a lack of congruency between
the Army’s espoused values (what we say we should
do), and the Army’s basic underlying assumptions
(what we actually do), which can cause a trust deficit and produce an organizational culture that is not
conducive to the development of adaptive leaders. A
review of the espoused values from emerging Army
doctrine, focused on decentralized execution and
operational adaptability, is contrasted with the conclusions of a study conducted by Dr. James Pierce at
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the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College. Dr. Pierce’s findings suggest a lack of congruency between espoused values and actual practice.
His study brings into question whether the Army’s organizational culture is one that encourages the kind of
imagination necessary to achieve operational adaptability. This cultural disconnect is the primary barrier
confronting the Army’s campaign of learning.
To overcome this divergence in the Army’s organizational culture, the author presents Williams’s
framework for leadership as a way to help close the
gap between espoused values and basic underlying
assumptions. Williams posits a theory of leadership
from which the U.S. Army can glean critical insights in
its quest to change its culture and achieve operational
adaptability. Williams postulates that traditional notions of leadership are inadequate for today’s challenges—that they do not address the complexities and
diversity of the problems, threats, and opportunities
that groups and institutions must confront in today’s
globalized and complex world—if these groups and
institutions expect to progress. Traditional notions of
leadership unduly emphasize the role of the leader in
providing a vision or “showing the way,” while leading in primarily straightforward environments. In
contrast, Williams addresses the demanding task of
mobilizing people to confront their predicament and
solve their most pressing problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Every act of creation is first an act of destruction.1
		

— Picasso

In the Republic, Plato presents an allegory to describe man’s resistance to imagining beyond the
boundaries of his experiences. He describes three prisoners, perpetually held in strict bondage since childhood, chained so that they cannot move their heads
and limited to seeing only images cast on the wall of
the cave. The limits of their understanding are bound
by the shadows on the cave wall produced by the fire
behind them. One day the guards take one prisoner
to see the world outside the cave. Imbued with new
understanding, he can now imagine beyond the limits
of the world in the cave. When he returns to the cave,
he tells the others what he observed outside the prison
boundaries. Unable to comprehend the experiences,
they ridicule him and persist in their desire to destroy
those who would attempt to remove them from the
intellectual sanctuary and safety of the cave.2
This parable of man struggling to “think outside
the box” demonstrates the difficulty leaders face
when attempting to promote change in an organization, whether changing the culture or overcoming a
tactical-level adaptive challenge. In recent articles,
interviews, and lectures, former Chief of Staff of the
Army General Martin E. Dempsey highlighted “failure of imagination” as a major obstacle in an organization’s ability to learn, adapt, and find solutions to
complex problems. He uses the devastating disaster of
the British Petroleum (BP) Gulf oil spill in April 2010
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to underscore that “the once unimaginable scenes of
oil streaming from the broken well head at the bottom
of the Gulf of Mexico” are powerful images of a failure of imagination.3 Like the prisoners in Plato’s cave,
one BP executive said, “We’ve never seen anything like
this before. It’s impossible to fathom the impact.”4
FINDINGS
It is the failure to be creative, or to use one’s imagination to anticipate problems and come up with innovative solutions, that puts leaders like the BP executives or military leaders on the complex battlefields of
the 21st century at risk of experiencing catastrophic
failure. This paper confirms the necessity for the U.S.
Army to promote the development of adaptive leaders. Army leaders must embody the attribute of creativity and possess the skills for leading groups to do
adaptive work (to learn). This paper establishes the
need for the U.S. Army to make changes to its organizational culture. Specifically, the Army must abandon the basic underlying assumption that control and
stability are “how we get things done.” It must align
its espoused values (what we say we should do) of
adaptability and decentralized execution with basic
underlying assumptions (what we actually do). Finally, this paper demonstrates the need to expand the
Army’s understanding of leadership beyond current
doctrine, departing from the traditional leadership
model focused on the leader who provides solutions,
and adopt instead a new paradigm in which leadership is perceived as an activity that mobilizes groups
to face the reality of a changed environment and orchestrates group learning (adaptive work).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
•	Eliminate completely the current officer evaluation system and corresponding promotion
system. Replace the system with one that identifies, develops, and rewards adaptability, creativity, entrepreneurial behavior, and prudent
risk-taking.
•	Initiate a 360-degree developmental feedback process for all noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) and commissioned officers to identify
bad (counterfeit) leaders and develop all leaders in the spirit of the professional military ethic
(PME).
•	Expand the Army’s definition of leadership beyond the present scope of providing purpose,
direction, and motivation so as to include as
well mobilizing people to confront and address
problematic realities to accomplish adaptive
work.
•	Expand the Army’s Leader Core Competencies to
include the following additional competency:
“One who mobilizes. Navigates organizations
through adaptive challenges by confronting
people with the reality of changed conditions
and provides a learning environment for the
group to discover and develop adaptive solutions” (see Appendix III).
METHODOLOGY
A case study provides a means for analyzing complex organizational leadership in the contemporary
security environment. It presents a high-stakes problem set requiring an operational adaptation by a cav-
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alry squadron in Baghdad, Iraq. This problematic reality triggers a struggle in finding a creative solution, as
cultural norms serve as barriers against overturning
accepted solutions that have proven successful in the
past, even if they do not fit the reality of the present
(failure of imagination). The story highlights leaders
who are constrained by assumptions and, as a result,
fail to adapt quickly to a changed environment. Emphasizing the importance of reflection and a willingness to experiment and assume risk, the case study
transitions to an example of a successful application
of adaptive leadership and adaptive work performed
by the organization.
The case study serves as a microcosm of the challenges facing the U.S. Army. The corresponding leadership framework presented can be used as a model
for the Army as it attempts to move forward in its
effort to make adaptation an institutional imperative,
as shown in Chapters 1 and 2. This paper presents a
holistic approach to leadership whereby the leader
transcends being simply an authority figure and becomes instead a real leader who provides a safe and
creative learning environment for the organization to
tackle and solve adaptive challenges, as discussed in
Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the paper concludes with a
recommendation that Army leaders apply Williams’s
theory to the challenges confronting the Army’s leader development process so as to improve its efforts to
grow adaptive leaders.
To increase the chances of success, real leadership
must be approached as an interactive art. It is an art
in that it requires creativity and imagination, rather
than a singular set of well-honed practices; and it is
interactive in that one must be willing to “dance” with
the reality of the context so that the best solutions can
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emerge…real leadership requires a capacity to improvise, be imaginative, and make ongoing corrections
according to the specific challenge the people face, the
discoveries of the group as they tackle the challenge,
and the shifting dynamics of the context. Therefore,
strong diagnostic skills and considerable flexibility in
one’s intervention style are essential if one is to lead effectively in multiple contexts on multiple challenges. 5
—Dean Williams

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION
1. Rollo May, The Courage to Create, London, UK: Norton,
1975), p. 60.
2. Plato, The Republic, New York: Oxford University Press,
1945, pp. 232-233.
3. Martin E. Dempsey, “Driving Change Through a Campaign
of Learning,” Army Magazine, Vol. 60, No. 10, October 2010, p. 66.
4. Ibid.
5. Dean Williams, Real Leadership: Helping People and Organizations Face Their Toughest Challenges, San Francisco, CA: BerrettKoehler Publishers, 2005, p. xiii.
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CASE STUDY
IRAQ 2008-09:
OVERCOMING A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION
TO CONDUCT ADAPTIVE WORK
Just as our adversaries adapt and develop new tactics,
techniques, and procedures, we too must be nimble
and creative.1
— National Defense Strategy 2008

The following case study is a firsthand account of
the author’s experience while serving as a squadron
commanding officer (SCO—pronounced Sko) of an
armored wheeled and mechanized cavalry squadron
operating in Baghdad, Iraq. The study provides relevant parallels with the three key elements of the adaptive challenges facing the Army: (1) emerging doctrine
on adaptation, (2) hindered by a culture of control,
stability, and risk aversion, which can be (3) overcome
by a leadership framework based on mutual trust,
experimentation, and risk-taking. Challenging the status quo should become a core attribute of the Army
culture. Continuously challenging all aspects of the
“way we do business around here” should become an
incontrovertible mandate that is simply understood as
a critical component of a healthy self-reflexive profession, and is therefore encouraged and rewarded.
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2008, 2nd Brigade of the 1st (U.S.)
Infantry Division deployed to Iraq and was attached
to the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B),
7

where it would serve under the command of the 4th
Infantry Division (3 months) and later the 1st Cavalry
Division (9 months) in the MND-B battlespace. From
late 2008 into the spring and summer of 2009, the brigade’s cavalry squadron, a subordinate battalion-size
organization of 750 Soldiers commanded by a lieutenant colonel, was faced with an adaptive challenge. The
enemy in the squadron’s area of operation (AO) had
adapted to the U.S. Army’s successful technological
solutions to counter the improvised explosive device
(IED) threat and, as a result, the enemy had changed
its primary weapon system from the IED to the RKG3 high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) hand grenade.
Along with this new weapon came new enemy tactics.
Instead of remotely blowing up a roadside bomb from
a safe and undetectable location, the RKG-3 was employed in a face-to-face close combat attack. The enemy would suddenly emerge from alleyways within
hand grenade throwing distance (10-30 meters) of the
passing vehicle and then execute a classic hit-and-run
irregular ambush.
This case study is a story of a squadron struggling with a changed environment and of its authority figure, the SCO, whose initial lack of imagination
resulted in what would be described by Dean Williams as counterfeit leadership.2 This prevented him
from exercising real leadership until he stepped back
from the problem, actively listening and sensing the
environment, reflecting, then properly diagnosing the
problem, and determining the need to empower the
unit to conduct adaptive learning. It is the journey that
one unit made to face the reality of a changed environment, to understand a complex problem, to reframe it,
and then through the exercise of leadership, to eventually induce the squadron to conduct the necessary
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adaptive work3 to defeat the threat. Ultimately, as a
result of successful tactical engagements based on this
adaptive work, the unit not only protected itself from
enemy tactics, but the success of exercising leadership
by mobilizing the group to achieve adaptive solutions
created a new culture of operational adaptability, which allowed the squadron to go beyond just defeating a tactical threat. This exercise of leadership helped change
the organization’s culture and redefined the unit’s approach to all future adaptive challenges, ultimately allowing the organization to destroy an entire insurgent
network with experimental, creative, and innovative
combined operations by, with, and through the 54th
Iraqi Army Brigade in northwest Baghdad.
UNDETECTED CHANGE IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
This journey began in September 2008, while 5th
Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (5-4 Cavalry), conducted a relief-in-place (RIP) with 1st Squadron,
75th Cavalry Regiment (1-75 Cavalry), in northwest
Baghdad. After 5 years of unit rotational transitions,
units had become very adept at transferring authority for an AO as new units replaced outgoing units.
1-75 Cavalry was completing a 15-month tour as part
of the Surge Campaign. Its tour was highlighted by
the traditional combat threats of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM (OIF): snipers and IEDs. In April and May
2008, 1-75 Cavalry participated in high-intensity close
combat during a Shia uprising in the Shula neighborhood. After they soundly defeated this threat, the
remainder of their tour was focused on consolidating the gains of the clear/hold stages articulated in
the updated U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine
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of clear/hold/build. The 1-75 Cavalry then began to
rebuild their area under the umbrella of the security
they and their Iraqi Security Force (ISF) partners had
established during the Surge. The 1-75 Cavalry’s AO
encompassed Shia and Sunni neighborhoods, with an
ethnic fault line presenting most of their challenges.
The 1-75 Cavalry’s positive relationship with the Sons
of Iraq (SoI) elements (former Sunni insurgents turned
allies in the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq) meant that
they faced minimal anti-Coalition activity in their
Sunni neighborhoods. Violence was down by 80 percent across Baghdad, and the operational results of
the Surge seemed to indicate a turning point in the
conflict. The achievement of irreversible momentum
was growing legs and becoming part of the narrative.
As 5-4 Cavalry conducted the 3-week RIP transition with 1-75 Cavalry in October 2008, new internal
brigade boundaries were adjusted, and most of the
Shia population centers were shifted from 5-4 Cavalry’s AO into the AO of its sister battalion, 1-18 Infantry, on their flank. In essence, 5-4 Cavalry now had
primarily a Sunni AO, which had been relatively quiet
over the last 9 months. The U.S. Forces (USF) enjoyed
a positive and productive relationship with both the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the AO and, more importantly for local security, a strong relationship with
three SoI battalions in the neighborhoods. It appeared
that for 5-4 Cavalry’s tour, combat operations would
be minimal, and that fostering greater partnership
with the ISF and furthering the development of the
ISF would be the primary focus for the next 12 months.
The squadron would continue the “build” activities
of the clear/hold/build strategy and prepare for the
eventual passing of security responsibilities to the ISF
by the end of the tour.
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The first indicator that the tour would not be as
assumed came on the night of October 21, 2008, during the RIP transition with 1-75 Cavalry. The troop
commander (captain) of Troop A, 1-75 Cavalry and
the troop commander (captain) of Troop B, 5-4 Cavalry, rolled out of the squadron Joint Security Station
(JSS)—small USF and ISF joint outposts in the neighborhoods—to conduct a routine patrol to familiarize
the Troop B commander with his soon-to-be AO. As
the four-vehicle patrol left the safety of the JSS and
moved into the neighborhood via Route Cecil, an explosion alerted the JSS of enemy contact just outside
the gate. Initial assessment was an IED attack on the
passing patrol—the first in months against 1-75 Cavalry in this Sunni neighborhood. Further investigation
by a U.S. Explosive Ordinance Detachment (EOD)
determined the explosion was not caused by an IED,
but rather by an RKG-3 hand grenade that partially
malfunctioned, causing minimal damage to the up-armored HMMWV (Humvee). No one fully appreciated
the significance of the appearance of this new weapon
on the battlefield. It was considered an anomaly and,
because no one was injured, was forgotten almost as
fast as it happened. The units’ transition process continued as planned.
Two weeks later during the final hours of the
RIP, the two chains of command were meeting in the
squadron headquarters (HQ) for the final out-brief
from 1-75 Cavalry to 5-4 Cavalry to ensure that all key
information and intelligence, and all current tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), were shared; that
any previously pending issues had been resolved; and
that 5-4 Cavalry was prepared and felt comfortable assuming control for the 1-75 Cavalry AO. As the meeting was coming to a close, a large explosion sounded.
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About two kilometers (km) south of the JSS, a 1-75
Cavalry patrol coming to pick up its troop commander
from the meeting was hit. A runner from the squadron
tactical operation center (TOC) came into the conference room. He reported there were casualties this
time. The meeting broke up, and Soldiers went into
the battle drills for reacting to such an event. The casualties, which were severe, had been evacuated to the
Combat Surgical Hospital (CSH) across the city in the
Green Zone. The two squadron commanders (SCOs)
and command sergeants major (CSMs) moved immediately to the CSH. A platoon sergeant, on his third
combat tour and completing what would have been
his last patrol of this 15-month tour, had lost his arm
in the attack. The weapon, which also destroyed the
vehicle and wounded all its occupants, was an RKG-3.
The 5-4 Cavalry SCO directed the staff to produce an
information brief on this new weapon the following
morning.
The RKG-3 is an anti-tank hand grenade. It has an
armor-piercing copper shaped-charge that can penetrate 9.5 inches of armored steel. It is thrown by using a wooden handle (it looks like a German “potato
masher” grenade from World War I), and explodes
on impact. This creates a small quarter-size hole of
penetration, producing shrapnel and spalling inside
the vehicle, with the molten copper dart itself destroying anything in its path. Originally designed by the
Soviet Union and carried by Warsaw Pact infantry to
be used in close combat with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) tanks, its proliferation around
the world makes the RKG-3 a cheap and easily accessible weapon for insurgents. For 5-4 Cavalry, it was an
enemy adaptation that had allowed the insurgents to
seize the initiative.4
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FAILURE OF IMAGINATION: COUNTERFEIT
LEADERSHIP
The 5-4 Cavalry officially assumed responsibility
of the AO on November 9, 2008, and went to work
to accomplish its mission: “To train and support
partnership-unit Iraqi Security Forces to secure the
population . . . to enable continued progress toward
achieving sustainable security and ensure continued development of Iraqi civil capacity.” Then, on
December 1, 2008, another RKG-3 attack occurred in
which the 5-4 Cavalry experienced its first casualties.
One Soldier lost his leg, and a dedicated Department
of Defense (DoD) civilian was killed. There was disequilibrium throughout the system, as frustration was
running high. The commander felt compelled to prevent another attack in order to protect his troops. As
the Soldiers looked to their commander for solutions,
the SCO prepared to provide those answers. He had
trained for 17 years to prepare himself to be a leader
in this situation, to use good judgment and make decisive, ethical, and tactically sound decisions in a time of
crisis. He was the commander, the premier authority5
in the organization under attack, and in this profession. That meant he was responsible for everything
the unit did and failed to do, and at that moment the
unit was failing to protect itself. In turn, as the SCO
prepared to provide answers and solutions, he too
looked to authority for solutions. He looked to the
commanders of the SoI—the Iraq informal authority
in the neighborhoods—for answers. Since these were
Sunni attacks in Sunni neighborhoods and USF were
paying the SoI commanders to prevent this kind of activity, the SCO planned to hold them accountable for
results.
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The SCO reviewed what he knew and provided
motivational speeches about greater vigilance and
enforcing standards of current TTPs to inspire and
calm. He gave sincere answers and provided wellintentioned technical solutions6 based on previous
personal combat actions and years of experience, all
typical and standard behavior for a commander seeking to lead his organization through challenging and
dangerous times. In retrospect, however, his performance evinced a failure to exercise real leadership and
a complete failure of imagination.
REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS: BENEFITS
AND LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY
One of the challenges in leadership is understanding and then managing the use of authority. Authority
is power granted to perform a service. Formal authority in the military is manifested when a commander
commits to meeting a set of explicit expectations, as
defined by the commander’s job description and the
profession’s standards. The Army is command-centric. Stated another way, it places tremendous responsibility on authority to get things done. This paradigm
creates an expectation that the commander must provide answers; that the leader embodies the all-knowing; and that, as a result, authority in the military can
be inappropriately substituted for leadership. When a
problem is too complex for the leader to solve alone,
a culture of authority-centric leadership places constraints on finding adaptive solutions. Conversely, if
a leader uses authority to set conditions for a group
to conduct experiments, which results in discovery
learning, then authority becomes a combat multiplier.
In this paradigm, authority is used to create space for
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the group to do adaptive work and find solutions to
complex problems.
Within days the SoI leaders provided “actionable
intelligence.” They provided the typical technical solution the unit sought; paid informants came forward
who could point out where the alleged perpetrators
bedded down. The squadron acted decisively, conducting midnight raids and arresting accused suspects. The raids brought back a sense of equilibrium
and curbed the sense of helplessness for the unit, but
the ensuing tactical questioning and interrogations by
the ISF yielded no proof that the unit had picked up
the right people.
Although equilibrium and morale were temporarily restored, the SCO’s intuition was that they had not
solved the real problem. In an attempt to find a solution, the SCO reverted to another time-tested technical
response: he would bring in the “big dog.” He would
ask the brigade commander (higher HQ authority) to
come to the next neighborhood council meeting and
confront and challenge the local civil leadership. The
brigade commander met with local Iraqi leaders and
demanded that the attacks on 5-4 Cavalry stop or the
money he controlled for infrastructure projects would
cease to flow into their communities. Pressure was
also applied to the partner ISF units, but they were as
clueless as the USF as to the source of this new threat.
They even denied that the RKG-3 was the weapon being used (despite the USF leaders holding the safety
pin and other RKG-3 components recovered from the
attack sites and the enemy posting propaganda videos
of the attacks on the internet).
Two weeks of quiet gave the unit a sense that the
problem had been solved. They had looked to their
authority figures—the Soldiers to the SCO and their
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troop commanders, the SCO to the SoI leaders (informal authority) and the brigade commander (formal
authority); the unit had used the tools of the past to
apply technical solutions to the problem—increased
vigilance, strict adherence to standard operating
procedures and TTPs, raids and apprehension of
suspects—and threatened to cut off money for local
infrastructure projects. The problem seemed to be resolved. Then on December 14, 2008, their equilibrium
was once again disrupted as another patrol was hit
by an RKG-3 on Route Cecil. The gunner survived,
although he was severely wounded. The gunner and
his crew were doing all the right things, using all the
time-proven TTPs the unit had used during its trainup and certification for deployment. Why, then, were
he and his crew members tactically defeated?
FACING REALITY AND DIAGNOSING THE
REAL PROBLEM
The unit was being defeated because during their
train-up for deployment the threat (which had become
the routine problem on the battlefield of Iraq) was the
IED. Time-tested, counter-IED tactics and procedures
had proven to be effective in the past for solving the
problem (force protection in Iraq) and had become an
accepted way that USF did business. The IED is what
they trained to defeat, and they were trained well.
There is no doubt that if this crew were faced with
an IED, the results would have been different. But the
enemy had adapted; the environment had changed.
Five years of aggressive U.S. counter-IED technology and tactics had rendered the Sunni IED practically ineffective against the USF and its improved ar-
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mor and technological countermeasures. If the enemy
wanted to remain credible in the eyes of the population and relevant in the internal struggle for power
in the Iraqi political system, he would need to adapt.
The Sunni insurgent group, the 1920’s Revolutionary
Brigade, in northwest Baghdad had done exactly that.
They changed TTPs to adapt to the USF strengths and
became a credible irregular military threat once again.
They stopped risking their lives emplacing IEDs,
whose lethal effects had so dramatically decreased,
and picked up the RKG-3 hand grenade in its stead.
The SCO had to facilitate a solution to this tactical
problem. The problem was complex, and the solution,
if there was one, seemed hidden. The previous solutions provided by the SCO made people feel good, like
they were doing something to solve the problem, but
as far as truly solving the real problem was concerned,
the familiar solutions did nothing. The SCO was providing moral support, setting the personal example
by leading patrols and not asking his Soldiers to do
anything he would not do himself, but he was not exercising leadership in the face of a complex problem
that had no technical solution that could be pulled out
of an already established repertoire. At best, it was
counterfeit leadership, a bandage to make the unit’s
members feel as though they were on the offensive,
as if they had the initiative by chasing false tasks, and
as if they were winning. In fact, the opposite was true,
and it was now the leader’s responsibility to present
this reality to the organization and get down to the
real work at hand.
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REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM
One of the challenges in leadership is understanding and then managing the system in which the leader
is immersed. A military organization is a system of systems, made up of different factions, each with its own
loyalties, values, and relationships within the system.
These factions can place obstacles in the path of progress and thwart the exercise of leadership, because
their conflicting loyalties and values create agendas
counter to moving the group toward an adaptive solution. These obstacles could come in the form of higher
HQ using authority to discourage experimentation
because of the risk and fear that failure could reflect
poorly on them. It can be a faction inside the unit that
is clinging to past assumptions or a faction that does
not see the benefit of offensive action and just wants to
survive and get everyone home alive.
These systemic dynamics, reinforced by a hierarchical organization prone to risk aversion, make it difficult for a military leader to exercise leadership. Navigating the system and being able to step out and put
oneself at risk requires a leader to shape conditions
within the system so that imaginative and creative
problem-solving can take place. Forming partnerships
and co-opting factions within the system are critical
in setting the conditions for experimentation and risktaking. This may mean getting buy-in from the chain of
command to provide top-cover in the event of a failed
experiment or educating those in factions below that
the risk and experimentation are actually aligned with
their current loyalties, practices, and beliefs. In this
case it means selling the concept to resistant factions

18

that innovative offensive solutions are the best way to
accomplish the mission while increasing the chances
of bringing everyone home alive. In this scenario,
the commander brings together elements of multiple
factions that share similar goals and empowers them
to develop solutions. By co-opting multiple factions,
when it is time to move the group toward accepting
required adaptation, the leader sets the conditions
for removing enough institutional inertia by building
consensus and allowing the group to progress.
INTERVENTION: PUTTING THE WORK ON THE
GROUP
The SCO decided to bring a larger group of diverse
leaders together, present them with a diagnosis of the
problem, and put the group to work to come up with
adaptive solutions to their challenge. The SCO brought
in 12 members of the command, ranging from staff
sergeant to major. Rank and authority played little, if
any, part in the decision on whom to bring to what
would become known as the RKG-3 Defeat Working
Group. The criterion for selection was based on the
SCO’s personal observation of these leaders over the
previous 20 months. The selection criteria included
leaders who had developed innovative training in
the past, leaders who showed a propensity for taking
prudent risk, leaders who had invented new tactics or
new equipment configurations, and leaders who demonstrated an ability to transfer knowledge from one
scenario to another and were skilled at imbuing it in
others as well.
The diagnosis revealed that the unit had an enemy who had changed TTPs and weapon systems to
adapt and overcome USF strengths, which were im-
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proved armor protection and counter-IED technology. The enemy adapted by going low-tech—running
from dark alleys and throwing armor-piercing hand
grenades. No high-tech jammer was going to stop an
individual from running and throwing a grenade.
Though it was 1950s Soviet armor-piercing technology, it was sophisticated enough to penetrate the uparmored HMMWVs and mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) armored fighting vehicles that were
employed to counter the IED threat in Iraq. Furthermore, the USF counter-IED mentality was defensive in
nature. The mindset was: jam signals that trigger the
IED, wrap armor around yourself, and hope the IED
does not go off, or if it does, that it is misdirected or
the armor prevents catastrophic penetration.
After presenting this reality, the SCO provided the
following guidance to the working group:
Don’t fight the ‘last war’ or your last deployment, take
the gloves off, anything goes, think outside the box,
question assumptions, be creative, use your imagination. . . . I want to hear any and every idea you have.
Weigh risk, but do not let risk prevent you from presenting an idea . . . it may not be as risky as driving
down Route Cecil under current conditions.7

The SCO left no one in charge and left the conference
room, shutting them in alone.
The SCO returned 1 1/2 hours later and joined the
discussion. The group had formed its own dynamics;
still, no one was in charge, and the commander reintegrated into the group as a contributing member and
not as “the SCO.” The intent of leaving the room had
been to take authority out of the equation. If the SCO
had stayed, the group, by the very nature of group
dynamics and Army culture, would have looked to
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him for solutions, and even if he put the work back
on them, answers would be generated to satisfy the
authority and not to attack the problem with an open
mind. When he returned, the group had mobilized to
do work, and the power and momentum of the group
were not derailed by the reappearance of authority. The group knew it was on the path to adaptive
solution(s). The SCO joined the discussion as a group
member, not as the leader, and as a group it developed a framework for how to overcome its adaptive
challenge.
ADAPTIVE WORK AND OVERCOMING
BARRIERS
From this session, the RKG-3 holistic defeat approach was born: attacking the thrower, attacking the
network, and co-opting the population. The immediate focus was how to change, modify, and adapt the
TTPs to attack the thrower. This was a critical forceprotection issue; the unit had to protect itself with
new tactics and because it believed that success in this
critical task would lead to success in the other two.8
The rallying cry which sprang from the meeting was:
“Be the hunter, not the hunted!” This problem was
very complex and, as a result, the adaptive solutions
were far-reaching. For the purpose of this case study,
covering all of or listing the actual experimental techniques and innovative solutions in their entirety is
beyond the scope of this case study, but shared below
are a few of the proposed solutions and insights that
are indicative of the adaptive mentality of the group.
First, the enemy always attacked the last vehicle
in the patrol. It was the most vulnerable, because the
other vehicles had passed the point of attack, allow-
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ing the attackers time and space to make their escape.
Providing protection for the last vehicle was thus critical and became the focus of the new tactics. Protection from IEDs meant more armor protection for the
gunner who sits exposed through a hole in the roof of
the vehicle. This increased armor, while it protects the
gunner from IED shrapnel, also drastically decreases
visibility and severely limits the gunner’s ability to
maneuver his weapon to react to the RKG-3 thrower.
Target acquisition was identified as the single
most important factor in preventing an RKG-3 ambush, an issue not relevant in the IED fight where the
trigger man is likely out of sight and provides no sign
to identify himself as the target. In an RKG-3 ambush,
the gunner has a split second to identify the attacker,
who will be hiding in a crowd or down a dark alley;
assess hostile intent; bring his weapon into position;
take aim; and fire from a moving vehicle before the
attacker can make a baseball-style throw and run—a
seemingly impossible task. The recommendation from
the group: take a welding torch to the armor plates surrounding the gunner. Cut the plates away and expose
the gunner so he can see and maneuver freely. This
was considered radical, despite being common sense.
The commander was all for it. The SCO’s Personal Security Detachment (PSD) was the first to implement it.
Figure CS-1 is a slide from 5-4 Cavalry’s TTP briefing
demonstrating the “before and after” look of the turret
based on the recommended modifications.9

22

Figure CS-1. “Before and After” Recommended
Turret Modifications.
This solution met immediate resistance within the
squadron as a whole. Those who did not have the
benefit of being part of the working group had not
come to grips with the reality of the current threat environment. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with
multiple tours in Iraq (some saved by armor protection from IED attacks in previous tours) protested
that these adaptations assumed unnecessary risk in
exposing the gunner to an IED explosion. Their lack of
understanding limited their innovative spirit and prevented them from seeing the value of experimenting.
On one particular day, the SCO became engaged
in a heated discussion with a passionate platoon sergeant, who refused to allow the welder to cut the
armor plates from in front of his gunner. Asked to
explain why, the platoon sergeant clung to past successful assumptions that the plates were there to protect the gunner from shrapnel from an IED and the
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sergeant cited a number of examples from his tour in
Iraq in 2005, when the plates saved the gunner’s life.
The platoon sergeant was then asked: When was the
last IED attack in the 5-4 Cavalry AO? In fact, there
had been no IEDs in 2008 in the AO being discussed.
Then the sergeant was asked how many RKG-3 attacks there had been. By the end, the SCO was able to
help him see the reality of the current situation, and
the welder went to work.
This encounter brought to the forefront the challenge that leaders confront when having to ensure
the whole organization faces the reality of the current
situation. This realization meant the smaller cohort of
leaders from the working group had the responsibility to go back to their organizations and mobilize the
larger group. The SCO and CSM intervened by going
on the circuit—a “world tour” explaining the problem, laying out the diagnosis, and leading the group
in the learning process. They owed it to the Soldiers
and the junior leaders of the organization to explain
the “why” so they understood and could have ownership for the experimental procedures and other adaptations. They met with each platoon (18 total) separately and explained the adaptive challenge and the
adaptive work to be done. The concluding slide of the
briefing used in the intervention with the platoons is
shown in Figure CS-2.10
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Figure CS-2. Platoon Intervention Briefing.11
These platoon briefings went a long way in helping the unit move forward. Despite these efforts, 10
to 20 percent of the organization refused to face the
reality. Despite future success and validation of the
adaptations, this small group of holdouts never saw
the value in the innovations, experimentation, and ultimately the feasibility of the adaptive work. This fact
further accentuates the challenge of leading people
through the learning process when they hold threatened strong beliefs and trusted practices.
Another innovative solution, also part of solving
the target-acquisition issue, was taking the crewserved weapon off the turret and arming the gunner
with a shotgun instead. The mounted crew-served
weapon was usually a .50 caliber machine gun, meant
for engagements 500-1,500 meters away, or an M240
machine gun, likewise a weapon meant for a high
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rate of fire and longer-range engagements. Both can
produce major collateral damage in an urban environment, with neither weapon conducive to rapid,
precision engagements inside 50 meters. The working
group challenged the assumption that a crew-served
weapon was necessary at all. The fact that it impeded
the vision and maneuverability of the gunner was further reason to challenge its presence. The fact was at
this point in the campaign, Iraq 2009, that the unit was
not going to face a threat such that every vehicle in a
patrol would need that much firepower. The nature
of the real threat, the 1-second RKG-3 engagement,
would not be won by an unwieldy machine gun but
rather by a quick-fire area blast of a shotgun, disrupting or unnerving the thrower and regaining the initiative.
By evening the odds, the movement to contact12
had become a meeting engagement13 instead of an
ambush.14 To lower the risk of collateral damage in
this close combat engagement, where noncombatants
would likely be caught in the crossfire, nonlethal
crowd control shotgun rounds were used. This was
because the throwers often would hide in crowds of
innocent bystanders to camouflage themselves and
use the civilians as shields for their escape, knowing
the U.S. gunner would not likely fire into a crowd with
lethal force, even in self-defense.
The experimental concept was this: Quickly identify the hostile intent, get the first shot off with an
area fire blast of a shotgun and prevent or disrupt the
throw. The crowd goes down, initially angry, wondering why they were just peppered by a crowd-control
shotgun blast. The would-be throwers on the ground
know exactly why the crowd was blasted, and they
will be up and on their feet immediately to escape. By
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this point, however, based on new innovative battle
drills, the patrol has stopped and dismounted scouts
who, with precision M-4 carbines, can take aimed lethal shots at the fleeing ambushers. The crowd now
realizes the rest of the story and is appreciative that
USF, in self-defense, did not engage the embedded enemy with immediate lethal fire.
The abandonment of the crew-served weapons so
ingrained in the mindset as “how we do business”
and the introduction of nonlethal rounds in combat
induced high levels of discomfort and resistance while
the group struggled with the adaptive work. The
squadron drastically modified equipment, changed
tactics, drilled and rehearsed new actions-on-contact
battle drills—all experimental in nature, all requiring
risk, to adapt to the new enemy threat of the menacing RKG-3. On February 5, 2009, along Route Cecil a
patrol returning to the JSS was confronted once again
by an RKG-3 ambush, but this time things were different. With the experimental equipment and innovative
tactics, the 5-4 Cavalry patrol defeated the RKG-3 ambush. Statistics tracked across all Iraq had documented
79 RKG-3 attacks between January 2008 and January
2009. USF win-loss record against the RKG-3 ambush
to this point was 0-79. The USF recorded its first tactical victory against the RKG-3 that fateful night when a
unit had adapted. The enemy was shot before he was
able to throw the RKG-3. Severely wounded by an M4
carbine round in the gut and shotgun wounds to the
arm, the enemy was saved by an American medic,
and he was taken prisoner. A feeling of elation was
felt across the organization, its sentiments captured by
the squadron’s executive officer that night in an email
he sent out to the organization:
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Tonight, I observed a patrol staged in JSS Ghaz-1 that
had just returned from yet another RKG-3 attack in
Ghazaliyah. There were very few similarities from this
patrol and the first three attacked patrols that had returned to Ghaz-1 since our RIP/TOA [relief in place/
transfer of authority]. This time, there were no pockmarked or destroyed vehicles; there were no medics
and litter bearers scrambling to treat the injured; there
were no worried and apprehensive looks. Tonight’s
attack had profoundly different results because of our
unit’s ability to evolve against a new and emerging
threat.15
Major David Dunphy, Squadron XO,
February 5, 2009

In contrast to the successful adaptations as described above, the last two successful RKG-3 attacks
in Baghdad/Abu Ghraib were on January 29 and
February 1, 2009. It is important to note the TTPs in
use in the first video by a transit unit moving through
5-4 Cavalry’s AO. The unit is not using new counterRKG-3 TTPs: In the last vehicle driving at 25-30 mph
(5-4 Cavalry reduced in-city driving speed to a hunting pace of 15-18 mph), the gunner surrounded by
armor has no situational awareness—facing to the
rear with his .50 caliber machine gun raised, using old
Cold War air-guard tactics as if a Soviet Hind helicopter may sneak up on him in Iraq. Using these TTPs, the
gunner and his crew have no idea what is about to hit
them.16
CHANGING CULTURE THROUGH
SUCCESSFUL ADAPTATION
Success bred success, and the unit embraced the
experimental modifications and innovative tactics
and aggressively trained them to perfection. The
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new TTPs became accepted as “how we do business
around here.” The squadron changed at this point.
This adaptive challenge had been met with an effective and imaginative adaptive solution, and the culture of the entire organization changed. The culture
of experimentation and innovation took root, and success of imagination began to spill over to all endeavors. Taking risk for the opportunity of a major payoff
became the norm. It ignited a new offensive spirit that
had been lost after years of base defense and counterIED TTPs.
The tactics were developed to regain tactical initiative and achieve force protection. Stated another way,
“the best defense is a good offense,” with the original
end state being to protect the patrols while moving
from point A to point B, while conducting the squadron’s primary mission of developing the ISF and
improving civil capacity. The 5-4 Cavalry continued
with this primary mission with new confidence that
its patrols would win a tactical engagement with the
RKG-3 ambush. Its new tactics became its trademark,
and since the enemy knew when a 5-4 Cavalry patrol
was passing, it experienced no further attacks. But the
challenges were not over. The enemy adapted again:
Don’t attack the patrols with the modified turrets and
new scanning techniques (5-4 Cavalry) . . . wait for a
patrol from another unit passing through the AO who
was using the old tactics.
The next adaptive challenge came on March 16,
2009, when a U.S. Army Military Police (MP) patrol
was on the way from the forward operating base
(FOB) at Camp Liberty en route to an Iraqi Police Station inside the 5-4 Cavalry AO to conduct Iraqi Police
training and development. The patrol was hit by an
RKG-3 ambush, killing one U.S. Army MP Soldier in
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the attack. Frustration again gripped the squadron.
Despite its best efforts to share the gospel for how to
maneuver inside their AO of the Mansour District and
Abu Ghraib (RKG-3 “hot-spots”) and attempts to proliferate the new TTPs used in their AO, many units
who transited the 5-4 Cavalry AO were still using the
TTPs for counter-IED operations and not counterRKG-3 operations. This was by no means due to a lack
of effort on the leadership’s part.
The SCO/CSM “road show” brief that was used
internally to educate the platoons in the squadron had
been requested by the Commanding General of 1st
Cavalry Division and posted on the division (MNDB) and corps (MNC-I) intranets for assimilation by all
units in theater. The brigade and division commanders both made reference to the new tactics, and the expectation from them was that units that transited the
5-4 Cavalry AO (aka the RKG-3 threat areas) needed to
read, learn, and implement these tactics. The squadron
went on to publish a TTP article in the Armor and Cavalry Journal and communicated with the Combat Training Centers (CTC), which are responsible for training
and certifying units coming to theater, explaining the
newly developed TTPs for counter-RKG-3 for integration into future CTC rotations. Despite the best efforts
of the chain of command, most units, because they
had not truly dealt with the adaptive challenge, failed
to change their behavior. The transfer of this implicit
and explicit information met resistance and was often
not employed by transit units in the 5-4 Cavalry AO.
The real frustration, though, was the fact that despite their ability to win the tactical engagement, they
were not providing security for others transiting their
AO. As the land owner or the maneuver unit responsible for the security and freedom of maneuver with-
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in its AO, 5-4 Cavalry took it personally that a U.S.
Army Soldier was killed in their AO. This adaptive
challenge was met with more innovation. The group’s
solution was to adapt again and take the new tactics
on the offense. “Be the hunter, not the hunted” was no
longer going to be a slogan for the “best defense. . . .”
It would mean going on the offense. Search and Attack17 operations commenced. When the 5-4 Cavalry
patrols rolled out, they gave the appearance of being
a transit unit by not overtly using counter-RKG-3 tactics, with the intent to entice the enemy to attempt an
ambush so that the patrols could attack to destroy the
enemy before transit forces moved into and through
the AO. This allowed the patrols to maneuver unmolested. Providing security—a classic Cavalry mission!—5-4 Cavalry had the initiative and that spurred
an offensive spirit.
The new offensive tactics were successful and kept
the enemy on its heels by taking the initiative away
from him and getting into his observe, orient, decide,
and act (OODA) loop. Over the next 90 days, RKG-3
attacks declined by 90 percent, dropping from an average of 10 ambushes a month inside the 5-4 Cavalry
AO to one attack a month by April 2009. The fact was,
however, that the squadron had not destroyed the
network responsible for the employment of the ambushes. That network could regenerate foot soldiers
and conduct attacks in the AO against transit units despite being thoroughly disrupted by the 5-4 Cavalry
TTPs. The next adaptive challenge was defeating the
network behind the RKG-3. Innovative tactical patrol
TTPs were not going to solve this challenge, but the
experimental culture born during the development of
these TTPs would be critical to overcoming the newest
challenge of destroying the entire network.
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Fighting networks was nothing new to USF and ISF
forces by 2008-09. The Army and Marine Corps had
met that adaptive challenge and over time the force
made the necessary adjustments from defeating the
regular forces of Saddam’s Army to fighting irregular
insurgent groups using networked cells to counter the
strength of the U.S. military. What the new culture of
imagination and experimentation in 5-4 Cavalry allowed the squadron to do was to take this entrepreneurial spirit into its primary mission of partnership
with the ISF. The squadron was partnered with the
54th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division, and the
two units teamed up to exploit the successful capture
of the first defeated RKG-3 thrower and the subsequent intelligence derived from him and others over
time as the network was attacked.
The 5-4 Cavalry and the 54th Iraqi Army Brigade
tore down traditional barriers of mistrust and stereotypes typical between U.S. and Iraqi Forces, and
pushed the boundaries of what and how intelligence
could be shared among the combined forces. Prudent
risk was taken in the sharing of intelligence, which resulted in a new level of trust, respect, and teamwork
that ensued from the experiment. Combining the human intelligence capabilities of the 54th Iraqi Army
Brigade and the technological intelligence capabilities
of USF, the 1920’s Revolutionary Brigade in northwest
Baghdad was ultimately destroyed.18
REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS: LEADERSHIP,
RISK, AND PUTTING YOURSELF ON THE LINE
The exercise of leadership is a dangerous endeavor. The higher the stakes, the more challenging the
task as the leader balances risk associated with lives,
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mission, and personal loss. Leadership requires moral
courage and a willingness to take personal risk, to put
oneself on the line. The defeat of the RKG-3 ambush is
a success story because the experiment ended with a
positive outcome. But leaders at all level accepted risk
to allow for the experiment to take place. What if the
outcome had been different, and the enemy had won
and lives were lost? There were many factions waiting
in the wings to discard those who had been willing
to step across the line and take risks. In a hierarchical
culture, leaders must be willing to take risks, allow for
experimentation, and stimulate the creative process
that generates discoveries.
This may place one in professional peril or even
physical danger, but this is the essence of leadership.
Soldiers must see you on the line both figuratively and
literally. You may have to demonstrate personally the
tactics and lead RKG-3 hunting expeditions, or you
may have to underwrite and take responsibility for
a subordinate’s failure. In the case of breaking down
barriers and pushing boundaries with the 54th Brigade, the commander role-modeled what was expected in this paradigm shift. In building the relationship
with the commander of the 54th Brigade, the leader
placed himself in vulnerable positions both personally
and professionally by placing trust in our Iraqi ally. It
went beyond sharing tea and exchanging pleasantries;
it was putting his life and the lives of his men in the
hands of the Iraqi commander, it was using discretion
in what intelligence was shared, it was bending rules
to build a relationship.
These were all risks. If they had gone badly, for
example if a U.S. Soldier was killed while subjected
to tactical decisions of the Iraqi commander or if classified information shared with the 54th Brigade was
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compromised, the U.S. commander assuming this risk
could face reprimand or relief by factions less willing to be creative. In the end, the exercise of leadership is about setting conditions for progress. During
times of adaptive challenges that require creative and
imaginative problem-solving, it means taking risk
and shaping the environment for the unit to conduct
experiments. In a culture that is averse to failure, it
requires the leader to accept personal risk and be prepared to assume the responsibility of failed efforts by
subordinates using their imagination to find adaptive
solutions. This willingness to assume risk must be
tempered with an understanding of how to swim in
the dangerous waters of leadership.
This point is so important that I will develop it by
speaking directly to potential leaders in the second
person: Leadership requires you to be present to exercise it. If you allow yourself to be marginalized or
relieved, then you may have failed in your exercise
of leadership. Be careful not to assume the role of the
crusader or make yourself a martyr. Master the art of
staying alive to fight another day. Pick your battles
wisely, but when you do, be ready to step out on the
line. There may be a time to fall on your sword, but
understand you lose all say in the progress of the
group if you are killed off and replaced by another
who may not be willing to pick up the fight. One way
to facilitate the wise acceptance of risk and to survive
is to build alliances among factions in the system. Find
partners and lead change with a united effort. This
gives you more flexibility and increases the threshold
of risk tolerance by those who find your prudent risktaking uncomfortable or stressful.
The fact is that a network could be defeated19 by disrupting its supply lines, or capturing elements of the
cells, but could not be destroyed by USF efforts alone
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or limited combined operations under the old rules.
This was because of the flat organizational structure
and decentralized operating procedures employed
by the Sunni insurgent cells and networks fighting in
Iraq. Rarely is the network completely destroyed. In
the present case there was no failure of imagination.
With experimental combined (USF and ISF) operations
the entire network was dismantled piece by piece, culminating with a combined effort to capture the enemy
battalion commander of the 1920’s Revolutionary Brigade, a former major in Saddam’s Army whose area
of operation included northwest Baghdad (Mansour,
Ghazaliyah, and Abu Ghraib) and who had overseen
53 RKG-3 ambushes between September 2008 and July
2009 (providing mission command and logistical support, he was not an executor/thrower).
This insurgent leader would later brag to ISF interrogators that his cell had gone 5 years without being defeated by Coalition Forces (he was unaware of
the USF collaboration in his capture and thought the
ISF alone had uncovered him). This insurgent leader
boasted in his confession to the ISF that his 1920’s
Revolutionary cell conducted the IED campaign on
Route Irish in 2003-04, the most dangerous road in
Iraq during that period, and touted the IED and sniper
operations along Route Sword that claimed a number
Coalition lives from 2005 to 2007. Cross-checking his
interrogation results against historical attack data confirmed many of his claims. His capture by elements of
the 54th Iraqi Army Brigade with USF support ended
all RKG-3 ambushes across Multi-National DivisionBaghdad from that point forward. Due to the horizontal organization of this particular insurgent group, the
capture of its leader completely destroyed the 1920’s
Revolutionary Brigade, ending its 5-year reign of antiCoalition operations in northwest Baghdad.
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At this juncture, it is important to acknowledge
that 5-4 Cavalry was a system within a larger system
and that the larger system played a significant role in
the subsystem’s ability to be adaptive. The command
climate of the larger systems determined the level of
discretion and flexibility the SCO and squadron were
permitted to experiment and conduct adaptive work.
Despite 5-4 Cavalry’s immediate higher headquarters
(2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division) providing a
command climate supportive of risk-taking, that was
not the case at the beginning of the deployment with
regard to the next higher level headquarters (Division).
For the first 3 months, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and its subordinate units (to include 5-4
Cavalry) served under the command of 4th Infantry
Division (4th ID). In addition to the SCO’s own failure of imagination, the squadron was also immersed
in this larger system, which was characterized by a
hostile command climate in 4th ID—commanded by
a division commander whose caustic style of leadership produced risk aversion and paralyzed creative
thought. This period corresponds directly to the period when the subsystem had its failure of imagination
and struggled with overcoming its adaptive challenge.
The 1st Cavalry Division (1st CD) transitioned into
MND-B and took over for 4th ID. In contrast, under
the 1st CD leadership of Major General Dan Bolger
and Command Sergeant Major Rory Malloy, the climate was such that experimentation and initiative
were not only tolerated, but encouraged and rewarded. The climate established within this larger system
by the 1st CD command team provided the conditions
for learning and adapting, thus significantly contributing to the ability of the subordinate organizations
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to display operational adaptability. When 5-4 Cavalry
prepared to depart Baghdad at the end of its 12-month
deployment, Major General Bolger invited the troop
commanders and troop first sergeants of 5-4 Cavalry
to the division headquarters for dinner to express his
pride and admiration in their performance and initiative. His parting words to those junior leaders capture
the essence of overcoming a failure of imagination to
conduct adaptive work: “Yes Long Knives [5-4 Cavalry call sign], you out-fought the enemy here in Baghdad, but the real reason you won, and won decisively,
is because you out-thought the enemy.”20
LESSONS LEARNED FROM LEADING A
LEARNING ORGANIZATION
The current and future operational environments
that the U.S. Army can expect to face in this globalized and networked world will present ambiguous
and complex problems that will not always allow
commanders to reach into a bag of tricks and pull
out a suitable solution. For a commander, there will
be times when routine problems requiring a technical solution or the application of a standard operating
procedure will indeed apply, and as the authority you
will be able to apply your experience and expertise to
solve the organization’s problem. There will also be
times, however, when your authority alone will be insufficient to produce the best course of action or the
right solution to an adaptive challenge. In these times
you, the commander, the platoon leader, or section
sergeant must exercise adaptive leadership. Stated
another way, you must mobilize the group to face
the reality of a changed environment. You must be a
coach, an interpreter, a guide in helping the group to
conduct adaptive work.
37

This is not easy, as oftentimes it requires individuals and the group to challenge assumptions, abandon
entrenched beliefs, and change cultural norms that are
deeply rooted and have in the past proven to be successful. The more challenging the problematic reality,
the more the group will want to cling to what worked
in the past and resist change and uncertainty. The
organization will want to avoid disequilibrium and
will look to the leader to provide a solution that will
reestablish the equilibrium quickly and painlessly.
Unfortunately, easy and readily available answers are
usually the wrong solution for a complex problem, especially if it requires adaptation by a group.
Often complex problems call for real leadership
and require the person in a position of authority, like a
commander, to avoid providing counterfeit solutions
to appease the group and instead go against his/her
tendency and natural desire to be a problem-solver.
The authority may actually have to generate disequilibrium to mobilize the group to conduct adaptive
work. To do this, the leader must first be reflective and
be able to pull him/herself out of the fray to listen,
sense, think, and then diagnose the problem. Then, if
adaptive work is to be done, the leader must mobilize
the group to take risk, experiment, innovate, and produce change—change that may be met with resistance
and scorn from below and above. It is hard work to
exercise leadership when confronted with adaptive
challenges. It takes real leadership.
The exercise of leadership goes beyond the mere
possession of authority. Unfortunately, all too often
commanders rely only on authority itself, including
reliance on a repertoire of known solutions. This is a
risk-averse approach to command, an approach that
avoids creating disequilibrium. But it is in states of
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disequilibrium where the most effective social learning takes place. With this risk-averse approach, at the
end of your 12-month tour you will be able to say to
yourself, “We did what we trained to do. Yes, we took
casualties, but not because we were deficient in our
execution of approved solutions; the enemy just got
the best of us that day. . . . We didn’t destroy the enemy, but we feel that we disrupted him thoroughly. . .
. So I know in my heart we did our best.” Did you? Or
did you just lack imagination? Did you fail to adapt or
adapt enough? Did you take on the challenge of leading your organization to face the reality that the environment had changed and what you trained to perfection for 12-months before your deployment is less
relevant now that you are in the arena of today, where
in-stride changes and adaptations have to be made?
Did you have the moral courage, while in contact with
the enemy, to create disequilibrium in your organization so it could do real adaptive work? Did you create
a culture in which your organization became a learning organization? Or did you lack imagination, fail
to revisit assumptions, engage in work avoidance to
sidestep the real work, and provide counterfeit leadership from a position of authority?
These are the hard questions that commanders
need to ask themselves as they continue to face complex and ambiguous operational environments. Despite the superior comparative strength in military
capabilities of the U.S. Army, it is the failure of imagination that can be the U.S. Army’s Achilles heel. The
Army’s competitive advantage must come from its
intellectual approach to future conflict. It will not only
be the Army’s ability to out-fight the enemy, but to
out-think him, to adapt faster, and to seize and maintain the initiative, that will produce future victories.
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17. Search and Attack is a variant of the movement to contact
conducted by smaller, light maneuver units and air cavalry or air
assault forces in large areas to destroy enemy forces, deny area to the
enemy, or collect information. Search-and-attack operations may be
conducted against a dispersed enemy in close terrain unsuitable for
armored forces, in rear areas against enemy special operations forces
(SOF) or infiltrators, or as an area security mission to clear assigned
zones.
18. Destroy is defined as: (1) a tactical task to physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted,

41

or, (2) to render a target so damaged that it cannot function as
intended nor be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ARMY’S CAMPAIGN OF LEARNING
Leaders lacking adaptability enter all situations in the
same manner and often expect their experience in one
job to carry them to the next. Consequently, they may
use ill-fitting or outdated strategies. Failure to adapt
may result in poor performance in the new environment or outright organizational failure.1
Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership

As the U.S. Army prepares for the second decade
in the era of persistent conflict, it is incumbent on the
profession of arms to reflect on the previous decade of
war and learn the appropriate lessons. This reflection
allows leaders in the Army to diagnose, challenge, and
intervene in the system to promote change in order to
revamp the organizational culture and maximize the
growth in its next generation of military leaders, and
to strengthen their profession as it seeks to improve
its mastery and management of lethal force.2 In 2009,
TRADOC launched an introspective analysis, whose
thesis is the “campaign of learning—a set of initiatives built on the expectation of persistent conflict,
grounded in the lessons learned from 9 years of war,
and balanced against the emerging trends of the future operational environment.”3
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
We have always lived in uncertain, unpredictable,
and challenging times, but as a result of globalization
and proliferation of technology, today’s uncertainty
is fundamentally different. The security environment
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is much more competitive in the post-September 11,
2001 (9/11) world. Countering the Soviet conventional threat was, in theory, exploiting the predictability
by which the Soviet armored columns would attack.
While serving as a tank platoon leader in Germany
during the early 1990s, my ability to display conceptual agility was not an imperative, just my ability to
do math. It was “battlefield calculus”—there are this
many of them, coming in this manner, at this rate, and
my platoon can kill this many, at this distance, at this
rate. The paradigm was simple, with solutions generated from a repertoire of time-proven battle drills and
standard operating procedures.
Today’s tank platoon leader lives in a different
world. As General Martin Dempsey explains, it is a
world where “uncertainty is the result of persistent
conflict with hybrid threats, enabled by technology,
that decentralize, network, and syndicate . . . an environment where we should expect to be surprised more
frequently and with potentially greater impact.”4 As
outlined in the Army Capstone Concept, “The ability to
adapt depends on a fundamentally sound estimate of
future threats, challenges, and enemy capabilities as
well as an understanding of the future operational environment.”5 In simple terms, the future operational
environment (OE) will exhibit uncertainty and complexity. The future OE will be highlighted by asymmetric tactics employed by “hybrid enemies: both
hostile states and non-state enemies that combine a
broad range of weapons capabilities and regular, irregular, and terrorist tactics; and continuously adapt
to avoid U.S. strengths and attack what they perceive
as weaknesses.”6
The OE requires leaders at all levels to work within
the context of a host-nation/multinational construct.
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The OE will be focused on populations, thus presenting challenges in lingual and cultural differences. The
enemy will be networked and not always rational. The
host nation and the enemy will be news-media savvy
and will use information operations to achieve their
ends. Increasingly, in this networked and globalized
world, the threat will operate in flat organizations.
As Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom point out in their
book, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power
of Leaderless Organizations, to combat the strengths of
the United States, the threats in the networked world
will have minimal hierarchy, making their organizations highly adaptive and decentralized for rapid decisionmaking.7 Recent examples of this include Sunni
insurgent groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and
al-Qaeda (AQ) around the globe. The bottom line is
that the OE will remain ambiguous and complex, with
a highly adaptive enemy. It is this ever-changing environment that requires a fundamental shift in the approach to military problem-solving and Army leader
development.
ARMY INITIATIVES
Seismic shifts in how the Army operates after a decade of combat against irregular forces and networked
cells of insurgents employing asymmetric tactics
demonstrate that the Army can adapt. Like General
George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army from 2007
to 2011 suggests, the real question is, how quickly can
we adapt and at what cost?
General Casey concluded his annual assessment in the 2009 Army Green Book as follows:
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The Army of the 21st century described here will require continuous change. Our strategic environment
has evolved dramatically, and so has the Army. The
challenges of institutional change in large organizations like the Army are substantial, especially as we
are adapting an organization that is already the best in
the world at what it does. Our test must not be, “Have
we changed?” It must be, “Have we changed enough?”
Everything is on the table except our core values.8

Senior Army leaders’ reflections on decade of war
illuminated the need for the Army to codify new practices, values, and procedures. The U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) took the lead in
redesigning the Army’s conceptual foundation by reflecting on the previous decade of persistent conflict
and is aggressively pursuing a campaign of learning, “a
broad set of initiatives designed to produce an Army
capable of rapidly adapting to defeat unforeseen
threats.”9 The Army’s Campaign of Learning is General Dempsey’s strategic intervention to promote change.
The common thread in all the following developments and other TRADOC initiatives is the requirement for continuous learning and adaptability. It is
a recognition that the ability to frame complex problems, to understand the problem in context, and to
adapt quicker than the enemy can, is what will give
the U.S. Army a competitive advantage on the battlefields of the 21st century. In essence, it is the ability to
learn operational adaptability.
A brief description of some of TRADOC’s most significant contributions to the learning process reveals
that the Army—as a learning organization—is making remarkable strides within the problem-solving
process. The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) serves
as the intellectual foundation of the Army concept
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framework, setting forth the Army’s strategic vision
of future armed conflict. The central theme of the ACC
is operational adaptability, considering future armed
conflict within the context of four key trends in the
current and future operating environment: uncertainty, pace of change, competitiveness, and decentralization. The ACC also identifies the substantive adaptations that we must make in how we build leaders, and
how we train, learn, and organize ourselves.
The Army Operating Concept (AOC) describes
“how” future Army forces conduct operations as part
of the Joint Forces to deter conflict, prevail in war, and
succeed in a wide range of contingencies, all as focused
on the employment of forces in time frame 2016-28.
The ideas brought forth in the AOC will guide future
revisions in Army doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leader development, education, personnel,
and facilities. The AOC also elucidates the necessity of
operational adaptability in full-spectrum operations
against hybrid threats with the land warfare capabilities to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide
area security.
The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS)
seeks to establish the right balance between the three
pillars of leader development: training, education,
and experience. The ALDS describes three required
paradigm shifts as the Army adapts its leader development model: 1) the effect of complexity and time
on decisionmaking; 2) the effect of decentralization
on organizational leadership; and, 3) the need for the
ability to frame ill-structured problems. An excerpt
from ALDS highlights the following attributes and
core competencies sought in U.S. Army leaders:
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LEADER ATTRIBUTES
Army leaders must possess and model key attributes in order to reach their full professional potential. An attribute is defined as a characteristic unique
to an individual that moderates how well learning and
performance occur. Leader development must build
on the foundation of an individual’s existing qualities,
developing well‐rounded leaders who possess three
critical leadership attributes.
Character. A leader of character internalizes the
Army Values,1 lives by our Professional Military Ethic, reflects the Warrior Ethos,2 and displays empathy
toward Soldiers, families and those people affected
by the unit’s actions. Character is central to a leader’s
core identity. In our profession, competence places an
individual in position to lead—character makes him
or her an effective leader.
Presence. A leader of presence has credibility,
exudes confidence, and builds trust. Presence is conveyed through actions, appearance, demeanor, and
words.
Intellect. A leader of intellect has the conceptual
capability to understand complex situations, determine what needs to be done, and interact with others
to get it done. Leaders must have the ability to reason,
to think critically and creatively, to anticipate consequences, and to solve problems.
1 Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service,
Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.
2 Warrior Ethos: I will always place the mission first; I will
never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen
comrade.
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LEADER CORE COMPETENCIES
Army leaders apply their character, presence,
and intellect in leading our nation’s Soldiers. The expectations for what leaders should do regardless of
the situation are captured in the Army’s core leader
competencies. Core leader competencies are defined
as groups of related behaviors that lead to successful
performance, common throughout the organization
and consistent with the organization’s values:
One who leads. Provides vision through purpose,
motivation, universal respect, and direction to guide
others. Extends one’s influence beyond the chain of
command to build partnerships and alliances to accomplish complex work. Leading is conveyed by communicating (imparting ideas) and setting the example.
One who develops. Leads organizations by creating and maintaining a positive environment and by
investing effort in their own broadening and in that
of others to achieve depth and breadth. Developing
includes assessing needs to improve self, others, and
the organization.
One who achieves. Focuses on what needs to be
accomplished. Has an expeditionary mindset and can
adapt to unanticipated, changing, and uncertain situations. Achieving in the short term is about getting results, but in the long term it is about setting the vision
to obtain objectives.10
Additionally TRADOC is spearheading the Army
Learning Concept for 2015 (ALC), designed to win in
the competitive learning environment by creating an
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accessible, responsive, career-long continuum of learning that supports operational adaptability. Additionally, the Army Training Concept 2015 (ATC) provides
a vision for the Army’s way ahead for unit training,
which strikes a balance between operational and institutional training requirements and offers flexibility,
efficiencies, and a broad range of training capabilities
so leaders can maintain operational adaptability.11
Finally, TRADOC is refashioning key doctrine to
include Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations, which codifies the hybrid threat as critical to the commander’s
understanding of the complex combination of threats
the Army faces. FM 3.0 also integrates the doctrinal
concept of mission command—the adaptation that
captures what we have learned in 9 years of war,
including roles and responsibilities of leaders in distributed and increasingly decentralized operations.
The new Field Manual (FM) 7.0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations, supports
FM 3.0 and encourages an intellectual rather than a
lock-step management process by providing broad
unit training and leader development concepts and
encouraging the use of mission command in training.
OPERATIONAL ADAPTABILITY
Operational Adaptability emerges from these concepts and is the cornerstone of successful application
and integration of the military component of national
power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. It is a quality based on critical thinking,
comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and an ability to make
rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment
of the situation.12
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Application of this concept assumes that the Army
culture is conducive to innovation and experimentation, and rewards prudent risk takers, and that based
on this culture, those in positions of authority in the
Army are adaptive leaders with the skills and attributes to lead organizations through problematic challenges13 requiring adaptive work.14
As the Army attempts to move toward embracing
operational adaptability, the question remains, has
it as a profession made the necessary changes to its
culture to embrace fully the concepts espoused by the
emerging doctrine? Does the organizational culture
nurture the growth of this type of leader? No one in
today’s Army will deny the need to achieve operational adaptability, but aligning those espoused values with basic underlying assumptions is an adaptive
challenge the Army faces in fully incorporating new
behavior into its culture.
Acknowledgment of the changed OE and of the
need to achieve operational adaptability to survive
and win leads to the question: What type of leader
does the Army need to perform effectively in the context of operational adaptability? General Casey answers these questions when he stated: “Our Soldiers
must be led by agile, culturally astute, and adaptive
leaders.”15 Based on the current OE, our profession demands leaders with greater imagination and increased
awareness of “weak signals” of impending change.16
According to General Dempsey, “confronting hybrid
threats . . . in such an environment requires leaders
who not only accept but seek and embrace adaptability as an imperative.”17 In response to the emerging
trends in the OE, he goes on to state, “Our profession
must embrace a culture of change and adaptation. We
must think differently about how we develop leaders.”18
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CHAPTER 2
THE ARMY’S ADAPTIVE CHALLENGE
Creativity provokes the jealousy of the gods.1
				Rollo May

In his speech to the cadets at West Point, Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates stated that the Army faces
the challenge of adapting its practices and culture to
the strategic realities of the 21st century. “How,” he
asked, “could it better prepare itself, and in particular
its leaders, for a complex and uncertain future?”2 He
continued, “From the beginning of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, our Soldiers and junior- and midlevel leaders down range have been adjusting and improvising to the complex and evolving challenges on
the ground.”3 But he emphasized that it had taken the
bureaucracies here at home longer to “respond with
remotely similar agility.”4
William Deresiewicz, a former professor at Yale,
explained the “great mystery about bureaucracies” in
an earlier lecture to the cadets as he challenged them
to be “thinkers” and to avoid the tendency to be consumed by the bureaucracy they are about to join. In
reference to American leadership, Deresiewicz stated:
For too long we have been training leaders who only
know how to keep the routine going. Who can answer
questions, but don’t know how to ask them. . . . Who
think about how to get things done, but not whether
they’re worth doing in the first place. What we have
now are the greatest technocrats in the world. He asks:
[W]hy is it so often that the best people [in a bureaucracy] are stuck in the middle and the people who are
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running things—the leaders—are the mediocrities?
Because excellence isn’t usually what gets you up the
greasy pole. What gets you up is a talent for maneuvering. Kissing up to the people above you, kicking
down the people below you. Pleasing your teachers,
pleasing your superiors, picking a powerful mentor
and riding his coattails until it’s time to stab him in the
back. Jumping through hoops. Getting along by going
along. Being whatever other people want you to be, so
that it finally comes to seem that . . . you have nothing inside you at all. Not taking risks, like trying to
change how things are done or question why they’re
done. Just keep the routine going.5

Such is the dire state of leadership in a bureaucracy.
Colonel Scott Krawczyk, a professor at West Point,
here describes the model for officers as espoused early
in our country’s history:
From the very earliest days of this country, the model
for our officers, which was built on the model of the
citizenry and reflective of democratic ideals, was to be
different. They were to be possessed of a democratic
spirit marked by independent judgment, the freedom
to measure action and to express disagreement, and
the crucial responsibility never to tolerate tyranny.6

This model contrasts markedly with the career pattern of the self-serving bureaucrat in uniform, General
Courtney Massengale, as portrayed in Ken Follett’s
fine World War II novel, Once an Eagle. Massengale’s
foil is General Sam Damon, who spurns careerism
and instead insists on being one of those officers who
“think for themselves and act on their convictions.”7
As Brigadier General H. R. McMaster once wrote,
“Commanders and senior civilian officers must be
willing to underwrite mistakes, mistakes of com-
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mission should be tolerated, passivity should not.”8
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., once wrote:
“Collins and Bradley are too prone to cut off heads.
This will make division commanders lose their confidence. A man should not be damned for an initial
failure with a new division. Had I done this with Eddy
of the 9th Division in Africa, the army would have lost
a potential corps commander.”9 It is the fear of having
your head cut off for making a mistake or challenging
the status quo that hampers the imagination of leaders
and generates a culture of risk aversion.
During recent visits to Harvard’s Kennedy School,
senior military leaders have voiced concern over the
challenge of growing adaptive leaders. Lieutenant
General Robert Caslen, commander of the Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, stated that “his
primary concern is the culture of risk aversion that
could pervade the force.”10 This potential aversion to
taking prudent risk is exacerbated by the way junior
leaders perceive how risk-taking is promoted in the
current operating environment (OE), while the corresponding responsibility and accountability are not
being managed to allow for mistakes. This perception
is reinforced by the handling of incidents like Wanat
and COP Keating in Afghanistan. At these remote
Army outposts, relatively high U.S. casualties resulted
from clashes with Taliban forces. The ensuing investigations into the incidents resulted in reprimands for
junior and mid-level leaders, which was an example,
as perceived by many of those less-senior leaders, of
senior Army leaders taking punitive actions against
junior leaders for taking risks and making decisions.
These perceived signals could result in a paralysis that
runs counter to the espoused values of emerging doctrine.
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There are examples of zero-defect command climates in our Army’s past that provide lessons for the
Army’s leadership in managing risk in the 21st century. Dan Bolger in his 1990 Command and General Staff
College paper entitled, “Zero Defects: Command Climate in First Army, 1944-1945,” cites historian Russell
Weigley in highlighting that the “underlying tactical
weakness that precipitated the major crisis in the First
Army” was based on “‘unimaginative caution’ as the
overriding trait of these U.S. commanders. Most First
Army generals showed themselves ‘competent but
addicted to playing it safe.’ By comparison, Patton’s
Third Army and Simpson’s Ninth risked more and accomplished more with significantly fewer losses.”11
Brigadier General McMaster, former director of the
Army Capabilities Integration Center’s (ARCIC) Concepts Development and Experimentation Directorate,
who is also the principal author of the Army Capstone
Concept, stated,
We need to reject the assertion that future war will
differ fundamentally from recent and ongoing conflicts in order to protect future commanders from
what could become a tendency toward risk aversion
and over-control. Assuming information superiority
might lead some commanders to conclude that making near-perfect decisions based on near-perfect intelligence is the essence of command. Commanders must
be capable of conceptual thought and have the ability
to communicate a vision of how the force will achieve
its objectives.12

When asked what the Army’s biggest challenges
are as it prepares to tackle the future, General Ray
Odierno, present Army Chief of Staff and former
commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq, stated that
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“leaders will make the difference. We can build and
field equipment quickly if we have to, but what we
can’t build quickly are leaders . . . and we need leaders
who think differently and are creative.”13 Overcoming a risk-averse culture and imbuing the attribute of
creativity in leaders is an adaptive challenge for the
Army. It is an adaptation that will require significant
disequilibrium within the institution because it will
involve questioning taken-for-granted beliefs and ultimately changing organizational culture.
In his study of the Army’s organizational culture,
Dr. James Pierce “examines the degree of congruence
between the Army’s organizational culture and the
leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps
senior leaders.” At the macro level, the results of his
research strongly suggest a “significant lack of congruence between the U.S. Army’s organizational culture and the results of its professional development
programs for its future strategic leaders.”14 The study
suggests that what the Army says is important is not
believed to be truly important by the leaders in the
Army.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
In general, organizational culture is considered to
be very stable and difficult to change because it represents the collective repertoire of thinking, feeling,
and perceiving that has enabled the organization to
adapt successfully in reacting to internal and external environmental stimuli over a long period.15 Edgar
Schein, in his book Organizational Culture and Leadership, describes three levels of culture: artifacts that
are visible symbols of a culture (uniforms, saluting,
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language, etc.); espoused values, which provide organizational members a sense of what ought to be; and
finally, basic underlying assumptions, which evolve
from a continuous use of a problem solution that has
repeatedly been successful in the past and has unconsciously become taken-for-granted as the only way
to solve similar problems. Therefore, organizational
members instinctively perceive these basic underlying assumptions as “non-confrontable and non-debatable.”16 In essence they define “how we do business
around here.”
Schein emphasizes that the essence of an organization’s culture is its taken-for-granted underlying
assumptions, which provide consistency, order, structure, boundaries and ground rules, membership criteria, communication patterns, conditions for rewards,
punishment, and the use of power.17 Like Dr. Pierce’s
iceberg metaphor (See Figure 2-1), the true depth and
breadth of an organization’s culture lie beneath the
surface and are very difficult to perceive through superficial analysis.18 As a result of its hidden and often
subconscious nature, an organization’s culture makes
bringing to light the realities of incongruence between
espoused values and basic underlying assumptions a
most difficult adaptive challenge. Organizational culture is a critical factor in the long-term effectiveness
and survival of organizations. Consequently, senior
leaders who provide strategic direction and vision
for their organization must not underestimate the
importance of culture and must realize that they are
responsible for the analysis and management of their
organization’s culture.19
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Source: James G. Pierce, Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S.
Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level
Officer Corps? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, September 2010, p. 11.20

Figure 2-1. Iceberg Conceptual Model
of Schein’s Three Levels of the
Manifestation of Organizational Culture
THE REALITY FACING THE ARMY
Some have asked why we have placed increased emphasis on adaptation. . . . Several trends have emerged
over the past decade . . . these trends have created an
OE [operational environment] that is very dangerous,
increasingly competitive, and always unpredictable.
In response, our profession must embrace a culture
of change and adaptation. We must think differently
about how we develop leaders and how we organize,
train, and equip our Soldiers and units.21
		
		

General Dempsey
November 2010
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General Dempsey recently stated: “Aligning and
connecting our leader development programs and
policies with our conceptual foundation and doctrinal
changes such as mission command become the most
critical adaptation we can make within our campaign
of learning.”22 Dean Williams describes this as “the
work in the center.”23
The espoused values articulated in the emerging
Army doctrine and conceptual framework—adaptability, decentralized operations, discretion, initiative,
and comfort with ambiguity—seem to be opposed to
the basic underlying assumptions of Army leaders
who, as Pierce explains, “emphasize stability, control, formalized structures, and a results-oriented—
get the job done—culture that frequently attempts to
comprehend the ambiguity of the future through an
unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions
employed in the past.”24 Surveys completed as part of
Pierce’s study by senior lieutenant colonels and colonels across the breadth of the force demonstrate this
apparent lack of congruency. They paint a picture of
a culture that values control over discretion and playing it safe over prudent risk-taking, despite what is
espoused during formal and informal professional
development discourse within the institutional Army.
Pierce’s study reveals that the officers surveyed believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in an organization whose culture is characterized by:
• an overarching desire for stability and control,
• formal rules and policies,
• coordination and efficiency,
• goal and results oriented, and
• hard-driving competitiveness.25
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However, sharply indicating a pronounced lack
of congruence between what they believe the Army’s
culture to be and what it should be, the respondents
also indicated that the Army’s culture should be that of
a profession, which emphasizes:
• flexibility and discretion,
• participation,
• human resource development,
• innovation and creativity,
• risk taking,
•	long-term emphasis on professional growth,
and
•	the acquisition of new professional knowledge
and skills.26
Recent documents such as the Army Capstone
Concept (ACC), the Army Operating Concept (AOC),
the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), and
Field Manual (FM)-3.0, Operations, espouse the need for
leaders with skills and attributes found on the second
list set forth above to combat the threats and complexity of the current OE. Culture, however, is not determined by what the profession says it wants its beliefs
and values to be, but what it does, and that takes place
in units on a day-to-day basis where informal professional development occurs. The incongruence in the
Army culture highlighted by Pierce’s research creates
a “trust deficit” that militates against producing leaders with an entrepreneurial spirit. This disjunction is
the heart of the adaptive challenge confronting the
Army.
Dr. Pierce’s analysis uses the Competing Values
Framework (CFV) Model to evaluate the Army’s culture because of its high degree of validity and reliability.27 The CFV framework consists of four quadrants
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representing the four major cultural types—clan,
adhocracy, market, and hierarchy—including an explanation of the differing orientations and competing
values that characterize human behavior.28
In conjunction with the CFV, the Origins of the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI)
allows for the diagnosis of the dominant orientation
of an organization based on these core cultural types,
cultural strength, and cultural congruence.29 The results from Pierce’s 2003-04 research indicated a lack of
congruence that may be inhibiting performance and
unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and
over-reliance on stability and control.30
To operate effectively in the current OE, companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions should strive
to foster a culture that blends the characteristics of a
“clan culture” and an “adhocracy culture.” This blend
moves toward flexibility and discretion (see Figure
2-2), thus ushering in a beneficial evolution in Army
leadership.
Clan cultures are organizations held together by
loyalty or tradition in which commitment to the organization is high. The organization emphasizes the
long-term benefit of human resources development
and attaches great importance to cohesion and morale. A clan culture places a premium on teamwork,
participation, and consensus.
Adhocracy cultures include a dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place to work. People stick their
necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered
innovators and risk-takers. The glue that holds the
organization together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The organization encourages
individual initiative and freedom.
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Source: James G. Pierce, “Is the Organizational Culture of the
U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its
Senior Level Officer Corps?” p. 53. 31

Figure 2-2: A Summary of the Competing Value Set
and Effectiveness Models.
Instead of cultures that epitomize flexibility and
discretion, the bureaucratic nature of the Army can
lead to the creation of a culture that seeks stability and
control more commonly associated with hierarchy
cultures and market cultures (see Figure 2-2). This is
the challenge for the military professional, achieving
adhocracy effectiveness and clan-like cohesion in a
bureaucratic organization whose hierarchical chain of
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command is more conducive to a controlling culture
of efficiency and risk aversion.
Figure 2-3 compares what the officers surveyed in
2003-04 believed the culture of the Army to be (represented as the “Now” U.S. Army culture), with what
they believed the profession’s culture should be (represented by the “Preferred” U.S. Army culture). These
data highlight the gap between espoused values and
basic underlying assumptions, and the challenge for
Army leaders in reshaping the organization’s culture.

Source: James G. Pierce, data collection 2003-04, “Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?”32

Figure 2-3. “Now” vs. “Preferred” U.S. Army
Culture. How the Officers Surveyed Perceive the
Army’s Culture Is (“Now”) Compared to How they
Think It Should Be (“Preferred”).
Professor Douglas Lovelace, Director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College,
summarizes Dr. Pierce’s 2003-04 research:
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Dr. Pierce’s research data provide empirical support
to the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (2001), which suggests that the training and leader development programs of the Army profession are not adequately linked and integrated within the
Army culture. Dr. Pierce states that the Army’s future
strategic environment will be ambiguous and uncertain, and organizational culture and professionalism
characterized by flexibility, discretion, and innovation
offer the greatest opportunity to maximize effectiveness in such an environment. He postulates that if the
Army profession expects to maintain its social legitimacy and professional jurisdiction, which are focused
on the development and application of the esoteric
knowledge and related practical professional skills
of land warfare, then the Army profession must take
steps to make its professional culture, and particularly
the informal development program, congruent with
one that is characterized by flexibility, discretion, and
innovation.33 (italics added by author)

After a decade of conflict in which adaptive behavior has been successfully employed on the battlefield,
and 7 years since the previous research was completed, Dr. Pierce initiated a follow-up survey to see if the
Army’s culture had moved toward one more conducive to discretion and flexibility. His preliminary 201011 findings concerning the “Now” U.S. Army Culture
figures are discouraging when compared to the 200304 study, as indicated below (See Figure 2-4).
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Source: James G. Pierce, data collection, comparison of Army
Organizational Culture Data 2003-04 and 2010-11.34

Figure 2-4. “Now” U.S. Army Culture
How the Officers Surveyed Perceive the Army’s
Culture, Comparing Survey Data from 2003-04 and
2010-11.
What these figures show is that 7 years after the
first study was completed, as perceived by 494 officers
in the second survey, and despite a decade of persistent conflict, there has been no significant change in
perceptions of the U.S. Army culture, and certainly no
rise in the perception of increased clan or adhocracy
type cultural characteristics. Dr. Pierce states:
What they really show is that an organization’s culture is without a doubt extremely difficult to change
especially by superficial changes like modifying the
OER, changing promotion gates, changing the uniform, changing the length of career courses, sending
some officers to civilian schools, or creating a mandatory reading list, etc. In other words, our culture is far
more persistent than the era of conflict that we find
ourselves in.35
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OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT DATA
ANALYSIS
A brief examination of recent Officer Evaluation
Report (OER) data supports the findings in the Pierce
studies. One of the most powerful influencers of Army
culture is the OER. What the cadets listening to Dr. Deresiewicz’s speech and preparing to “think for themselves and act on their convictions” in their transition
from cadet gray to Army Blue are unaware of and do
not fully understand is that the current evaluation and
promotion system in the Army drives many leaders to
Massengalian tendencies instead of Damonian. Some
officers are rewarded on OERs for pleasing higher
headquarters, not rocking the boat, and maintaining
equilibrium in the system. The OER also sends signals
to the rated officer on “what’s important in the profession” and what is expected of a leader to achieve
professional success.
The current OER plays a highly significant role
in how the culture of the officer corps has evolved
in the last 25 years. The DA Form 67-9 (Appendix II)
that replaced the 67-8 in 1997 was meant to overcome
the shortcomings of the old OER, such as overinflation in assessing performance and potential, and to
be a developmental tool as well as an evaluation of
performance. Unfortunately, the subversive nature of
organizational culture helped to undermine the good
intentions of the current OER, and it has continued to
foster hypercompetitiveness and can inspire a “market culture” over a “clan culture” as highlighted in Dr.
Pierce’s paper.
The current OER relies on the Rater (supervisor)
and Senior Rater (supervisor’s supervisor) to assess
performance and potential. The front of the OER in69

cludes a list of skills, attributes, actions, and “yes/no”
criteria of evaluation with an additional X by areas
in each category that highlight the rated officer’s
strengths. The yes/no + X method does not adequately communicate to promotion and command-selection
boards (or to the officer for developmental purposes)
the true strengths (and weaknesses) of the individual
officer. More importantly, the front side constitutes a
significant signal to officers on “what’s important in
the profession.” The data on the following pages collected from Human Resources Command are a snapshot of recently selected battalion commanders and
may provide insight into how the institution rewards
skills, attributes, and actions conducive to a hierarchical organization that embraces the old notion of traditional strong-man leadership, control, and stability
over an adhocracy culture that rewards adaptive leadership, flexibility, and discretion.
The front side of the OER presents the rater with a
list of skills, attributes, and actions, requiring the rater
to select ones that “best describe the rated officer.”36
Words matter and have meaning, and the definitions
are important in the intellectual discussion of leadership in complex times. It is important to state upfront
that all the listed skills, attributes, and actions are salient traits and are necessary characteristics for a wellrounded and balanced leader. For example, there are
times when routine problems arise in which the problem definition and solution are clear, and the leader
must have the expertise, proficiency, and professional
knowledge to provide the group with the right solution from a traditional authority-based leadership
style. However, reiterating the themes of the ACC and
FM 3.0, the future OE will be one of complexity and
ambiguity and, as such, it is harder to develop concep-
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tual skills that the profession should want to nurture
and reward throughout the organization to align better with its values and actions.
Figure 2-5 provides the list of Army definitions,
which can be found on the front of the OER, to assist
in clarifying what the meanings of the words are for
raters and rated officers. Highlighted are key terms
to explain better the characteristics of the attributes,
skills, and actions. The words and phrases that correspond to key concepts and characteristics of traditional authority-based leadership are highlighted in
bold. Characteristics associated more prominently
with adaptive leadership are italicized:
The following OER data used in the analysis are
from a random sample of FY12 combat arms battalion
command selectees, who represent the top 15 percent
of a given year group cohort and are those most likely
to be promoted to colonel and to work on complex
strategic issues at the highest levels of the Department
of the Army (DA) and the Department of Defense
(DoD). They are the group from which the general
officers for the next 10-20 years will come. The data
may provide some insights into what the profession
believes makes a quality leader and potentially identifies the signals it sends and the traits it unconsciously
looks for when determining who should be promoted
and who should lead the organization at the strategic
level into the future.
Using Army definitions, these skills, attributes, and
actions can be separated into groups more associated
with the traditional notion of leadership (“authority
is leadership”) or more associated with characteristics
found more readily in adaptive leaders. Figure 2-6 also
includes the percent of “Xs” marked per grouping on
the sample FY12 selected battalion commanders.
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Source: DA Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation Report.37

Figure 2-5. Army Definitions of Leader Attributes,
Skills, and Actions.
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Source: DA Form 67-9, Attributes, Skills, and Action for FY
12 Command-selectees, sample data from U.S. Army Human Resources Command.38

Figure 2-6. OER Attributes, Skills, and Action
for FY 12 Command-Selectees.
The first significant divergence in traditional and
adaptive leadership characteristics is identified in
the “Skills” category. Technical and Tactical skills,
which are most closely associated with solving routine (nonadaptive) problems, received 60 percent of
the markings, whereas Conceptual (creative thinking)
and Interpersonal (coaching, teaching), which are key
elements of adaptive leadership, received only 40 percent.
Of most concern were the results of the Actions
analysis, which best describes the types of actions
leaders take and what is actually seen by subordinates.
The actions most closely related to traditional notions
of leadership are Planning, Decision-making, Executing, and Motivating; they were identified 75 percent of
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the time as the actions that most accurately described
the leaders selected for command, whereas adaptive
actions such as Communicating (listening), Learning
(leading change, adapting), and Assessing (diagnosis)
received only 25 percent of the Xs. Most revealing was
the insignificant percentage of marks for Learning and
Assessing—the two most critical actions for adaptive
work—their marks making up a combined total of less
than 8 percent.
What can this sample tell the Army? We can reasonably interpret this data as saying that the Army
selects leaders who value technical and tactical skills
over adaptive skills of conceptual and interpersonal
abilities. We can infer that the physical component of
leadership is considered equally important as emotional intelligence. Finally, being a planner who can
lead execution and act decisively for the group is
highly favored over a leader who is identified as having the strength to assess (diagnose), communicate
(intervene), and learn (lead change).
These percentages suggest that the leaders selected
for battalion command are best described by their raters as embodying the traits more closely aligned with
the traditional model of leader-follower than with the
exemplar of adaptive leadership. As we saw earlier,
the former is more likely to struggle in complex environments, while the latter provides the best chance of
overcoming adaptive barriers.
Another way to look at the front side of the OER
and its use as a tool to communicate to promotion and
command boards is to assess it through the lens of cultural gamesmanship. Hypothetically, raters who want
to give their star players a “bump” with the senior rater or the board will mark the X that will place the rated
officer in the best light, with regard to supporting the
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profession’s basic underlying assumptions. The rater
wants to send a signal that this officer embodies the
skills, attributes, and actions that we look for in our
leaders (not the values we say we want but the values
we promote and reward): Mental-Physical, TechnicalTactical, Plan-Decide-Motivate-Execute.
By marking the data on the front side of the OER,
as demonstrated in the preceding chart, and then subsequently selecting these officers for promotion/command, the Army’s leaders perpetuate the contradiction in the organizational culture. Though most will
acknowledge that selection boards place little or no
weight on the front side of the OER, it is still a subtle
but important data point and a signal, weak as it may
be, to the junior officers of what senior leaders think is
important and what gets things done.
The backside of the OER is open for subjective review of performance and potential. This includes the
“Senior Rater Block Check,” applied to field grade officers39 as a means of identifying the top 49 percent
and is a key signal for increased chances of selection
for command at the lieutenant colonel level. While a
healthy level of internal competition improves overall performance of an organization, the current senior
rater blocking system is a primary source of hypercompetitiveness within the officer corps and can feed
into a potentially dysfunctional, even toxic, competitive culture within the profession. In the end, a reasonable conclusion can be made that the front side of
the current OER reinforces a traditional hierarchical
leadership culture, with the back side encouraging
a market culture of hard-driving competition, in the
face of espoused values calling for adaptive behavior,
selfless service, and team play. This simple OER data
analysis reinforces the findings of Dr. Pierce, providing yet another data set that calls into question the
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present alignment of espoused values and basic underlying assumptions in the professional culture of
the U.S. Army.
ARMY LEADERSHIP
As the Army works through its adaptive challenge
of bringing congruence to its values and practices,
it should consider a broader understanding of leadership with regard to leading in the face of complex
problems. Developing creative leaders is only one
piece of the puzzle. Just because a leader has creative
attributes does not mean that he or she understands
the tasks of leading change, of mobilizing groups to
face reality, and of then guiding them through the
problem-solving process. A leader with the ability
to be creative can fall victim to the seductive ways of
counterfeit leadership. To exercise leadership, it is imperative that the institution teach leaders the skill of
leading in the context of adaptive challenges.
Currently, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, defines leadership as “the process of influencing
people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and
improving the organization.”40 Nowhere does this
definition touch on leadership’s most challenging
function of leading change by mobilizing people to do
adaptive work. While providing purpose, direction,
and motivation are critical tasks for an organizational
authority figure, if a more holistic understanding of
leadership is not imbued in the authority figure, these
very dimensions can lead to counterfeit leadership.
This is because an authority figure may enable an organization to avoid the reality of a changed environment through a false purpose and direction, or misleading motivation.
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The types of problematic challenges that leaders
at all levels of authority confront in today’s OE call
for a style of adaptive leadership requiring more than
simply purpose, direction, and motivation. Broadening the Leader Core Competencies to include “One
who mobilizes—Navigates organizations through
adaptive challenges by confronting people with the
reality of changed conditions and provides a learning
environment for the group to discover and develop
adaptive solutions,” will help capture the new skills
and framework required to be an adaptive leader (see
Appendix III).
WHAT’S AT STAKE?
What if the Army chooses not to confront the
contradiction between espoused values and its basic
underlying assumptions, thus hindering leader development? Or if the organization takes only half steps
when full steps are required to fully realize an adaptation? What is at stake is the Army’s ability to produce
the quantity and quality of adaptive leaders who are
creative, imaginative, and innovative and can lead
learning organizations on today’s competitive battlefield. It is the risk of operating at 80-percent effectiveness as an organization when 90 percent or better can
be achieved with cultural realignment. It is the question former Secretary of Defense Gates posed to the
Army leadership and was his main worry—“How can
the Army break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion
processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its
best, brightest, and the most-battle tested young officers to lead the service in the future?”41 What is at
stake is an Army that has counterfeit leaders that slip
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through the cracks and poison junior leaders with
toxic leadership. Most important, what is at stake is
our ability to win, learn, focus, adapt, and win again.42
Retired General Stanley McChrystal, former
commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Forces in Afghanistan, stated during a visit
at Harvard University that “the senior guy isn’t the
expert these days . . . that leadership today must be
done by, with, and through others.” 43 He gives an example of his grandfather leading in the Army in the
mid-20th century. General McChrystal explains how
so little had changed between the time his grandfather was a junior leader to when he was a more senior
leader. As a result, his grandfather could rely on his
past experiences and expertise to lead the group. This
was because the problems were not really much different, weapons and tactics were basically unchanged,
and he could rely on a repertoire of solutions from his
past to solve the problems of the present.
General McChrystal added that the 21st century
is much different, that today’s senior military leaders
must learn from the bottom up and from the group as
a whole, as they lead organizations in a world that has
changed so drastically from when they were young
leaders. He asserts that the expertise no longer lies
with seniority or authority, but from within the group,
and that the leaders, to be effective, must “have a
touch of humility, must stop, listen, and allow others
to inform you, and teach you.”44 Leadership in today’s
rapidly changing environment must reflect the truth
that “the wisdom of the whole is greater than the wisdom of one.”45
Chapter 3 presents an innovative framework for
leading groups to overcome adaptive challenges.
Its principles, which parallel the themes of General
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McChrystal’s insights into leadership in the 21st century can, if applied, assist Army leaders in tackling
the institutional adaptations it confronts. Adoption of
the leadership framework depicted in the next chapter
will increase the Army’s likelihood of growing adaptive leaders.
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CHAPTER 3
REAL LEADERSHIP
Systems are interdependent . . . if you want to keep
up with the system, then you have to evolve at least as
fast as the system. And if you want to get ahead of the
system, you have to evolve at least twice as fast.1
		

General Martin E. Dempsey

Leading a system confronted by a challenge demanding an adaptation requires a leader who can
transcend the role of authority. A leader must have
the capacity to mobilize people to confront their predicament and solve their problems. The focus of “real
leadership,” as presented by Harvard Kennedy School
professor Dean Williams, is not to get others to follow,
but to get people to confront reality and change values, habits, practices, and priorities in order to deal
with the real threat or opportunity the group faces.
Looking at leadership through a lens provided by
Dean Williams reveals a framework for approaching
adaptive challenges that the U.S. Army can exploit as
it tackles those challenges at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war. Williams defines leadership as “a process of mobilizing people to confront and
address problematic realities for the purpose of improving the human condition and making progress.”2
Williams posits that notions of leadership based on
a model suggesting that “leaders must craft a vision,
motivate people through persuasive communication,
be an example, and employ a system of punishments
and incentives to sustain action, is insufficient for dealing with the complexity of the challenges institutions
and communities face in the age of globalization.”3
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He presents an alternative idea of what it means to
be a real and responsible leader, one “that does not
emphasize the leader-follower and goal but the dynamic
of leadership-group and reality.”4
Williams defines an adaptive challenge as a problem that persists even when authority figures and
organizations apply best practices and known methods or when standard operating procedures do not
solve the problem. In these cases, the solution to the
challenge usually requires a shift in the values and
mindsets of the members in the group, making it an
adaptive challenge. The “work” or learning people
must do to overcome adaptive challenges is simply
adaptive work, which Williams defines as “the effort
that produces the organizational or systemic learning
required to tackle tough problems.”5
COUNTERFEIT LEADERSHIP
Over the last 25 years, the proliferation of leadership and management literature has revolved around
the relationship, links, and interdependence of authority, influence, power, and leadership. In addition to
providing a framework for the study and application
of adaptive leadership, Williams provides insights into
false or maladaptive leadership, which he describes
as “counterfeit leadership.”6 Distinguishing between
“real” leadership and “counterfeit” leadership is essential to understanding and applying leadership in
the face of adaptive challenges. Acknowledging the
dichotomy of styles is fundamental to the study and
understanding of adaptive leadership.
Williams, in his book Real Leadership, and, even
more so, Ron Heifetz in Leadership Without Easy Answers, go to great lengths to uncover and explain the
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relationship of authority and dominance in social
groups and how it affects the exercise of leadership.
Both authors link human nature to our evolutionary
instincts to seek protection and equilibrium within
our social systems by looking to authority for answers
to problems confronting the group. Linked to this
natural desire to look to authority for solutions is our
primal instinct that when in positions of authority, we
tend to assume the role as the Alpha in the group (even
if it is not our nature to do so). Basic primate groups
look to the Alpha for this protection. The Alpha uses
dominance in his role as the designated authority and
leads the group through this means. Reflecting on former groups and organizations, most of us can think
of times when dominant personalities have used their
formal or informal authority to run the organization
through dominance, fear, coercion, and ridicule.
The U.S. Army espouses the need for leaders
who can lead change, work collaboratively, and run
organizations that embody the ideals of operational
adaptability. Leadership through dominance will not
produce the climate in an organization conducive to
fostering these essential skills and attributes. As such,
we would like to believe that the Army has a culture that winnows out smothering leaders through a
command-selection process that withholds rewarding
the behavior of those who use dominance to lead—in
other words, a system that avoids putting counterfeit
leaders in command.
Unfortunately, as late as January 2011, the Army
had to relieve a brigade commander “due to a loss of
confidence in his ability to command.”7 The investigation described a commander who demonstrated
counterfeit leadership, what the journalist Jeff Gould
described as “toxic leadership.” The Army’s inves-
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tigating officer stated that the commander who was
relieved “demonstrates arrogance, deception, and
threatening behavior,” producing a “command climate that was ‘at best ineffective, and at worst toxic’.”8
How did a leader with these traits rise to one of the
highest tactical commands in the U.S. Army? What
behavior was overlooked or even rewarded over his
22 years of service before he was handpicked by one
of the most competitive selection boards in the Army
to command the organization’s centerpiece maneuver
formation—the Brigade Combat Team manned by
4,000 U.S. Soldiers? These are important questions for
leaders managing the Army’s culture.
Persons in positions of authority, which in the U.S.
Army are “the commanders,” who lack the ability
to reflect, to stand back from the fray to take a large
view of the system, and who cannot learn, are prone
to providing counterfeit leadership. The avoidance of
counterfeit leadership can thus be a significant waypoint in an authority figure’s approach to moving an
organization forward. As members of social systems,
humans depend on authority to provide order and
structure. This dependency can cause a group to have
false expectations of the authority figure, i.e., expecting the commander to provide all the answers. This is
because, as Riley Sinder and Ron Heifetz of Harvard’s
Kennedy School have stated: “[I]n our everyday language, we equate leadership with authority.”9 Because
we so commonly equate leadership with authority, we
fail to see the obstacles to leadership that come with
authority itself. “Having authority brings not only
resources to bear but also serious constraints on the
exercise of leadership.”10 Unlike leadership, which is
a choice, authority is a service. Authority provides order, protection, direction, and accountability. In times
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of high stress, an overreliance on authority to bring
equilibrium to the system or group can bring a false
sense of security. Authority is frequently embraced by
the group, and in return it feeds the group’s hunger
for equilibrium. It does this by providing simple technical solutions to complex problems, which allow the
group to avoid the work required to confront the need
to adapt.11 This dynamic results in counterfeit leadership.
REALITY AND LEADERSHIP
The primary duty of a leader is to help the group
face the reality of their problematic challenges. The
leader must take on this responsibility because, if not,
the group will engage in work avoidance—avoiding
the reality of the changed conditions—because reality in adaptive scenarios will force group members to
confront their countervailing values and deeply rooted
beliefs, thereby causing disequilibrium in the system.
Avoiding reality by attacking symptoms and making
excuses allows people to “distance themselves from
the responsibility of the real issue,” Williams says.12
It is human nature for people to avoid acknowledging a changed environment in an effort to maintain
equilibrium within their systems. Facing the reality of
a changed world is frightening, but when confronted
by an adaptive challenge, the leader must be willing
to take the responsibility to impose disequilibrium
on the system, no matter how painful or disturbing
it might be to the members of the organization. This
must be done before the group can begin adaptive
work. It is in the state of disequilibrium where real
learning takes place.13
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A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ADAPTIVE
LEADERSHIP
The exercise of leadership is discretionary, involving a choice as to whether to take responsibility and
“respond to problems, dysfunctions, and tremendous
opportunities that emerge in our organizations.”14
Williams presents the following framework for exercising leadership. To get people to face their adaptive
challenges, a leader must be responsible for the following:
1. The diagnostic process, determining the precise
nature of the problem and assessing the group’s readiness to confront the problem.
2. Manage the problem-solving process as an inclusive process by the group as it works through conflicts in
values and priorities and embraces new practices that
bring resolution to problematic situations and open
up pathways for genuine progress.
3. Conceiving of oneself as an instrument of power,
that is, achieving awareness of how one’s power—authority, presence, and interventions—affect the thinking and actions of others as they tackle their challenges is essential to success. “Ultimately, one’s power and
authority must not be used to get others to follow, but
to get the group to confront reality, so necessary for
adaptive work.”15
As depicted in Figure 3-1, this framework requires
the leader, who is an integral part of the system, to
pull himself/herself out of the system, to sense the
environment by listening to all factions, while diagnosing the true nature of the challenge. The leader
then develops an intervention strategy and reenters
the system to confront the group with the reality of
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the changed environment. Then, working through the
system, the leader helps the group do adaptive work.
The leader manages the learning process by preventing the group from engaging in work avoidance and
keeps them focused on the work at the center. The
leader ensures that the right level of disequilibrium
is present for real learning to take place and helps the
system achieve the aspiration to solve its adaptive
challenge.

Work through the
system
(social learning)

Source: Using concepts from Dean Williams, Ronald Heifetz,
and Marty Linsky, the author developed the visual depiction of
the theory of exercising leadership in a system as presented by
Dean Williams in MLD-201: Exercising Leadership: The Politics of
Change, Harvard Kennedy School, January-April 2011.16

Figure 3-1. Author’s Conceptual Depiction
of Dean Williams’s Exercising Leadership
within a System.
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Throughout the process, the leader must be aware
of him- or herself, assuring that he/she does not allow
the group to seduce him/her to become the technical solution provider. The leader’s self-awareness is
essential to ensuring that he/she does not divert the
group through counterfeit leadership by using power
to get others to follow, instead of using the authority and power to get the group to face reality, prevent
work avoidance, and adapt to solve the problem. The
leader must also ensure that he/she is not “killed off”
(marginalized, undermined, ignored, or relieved/
fired) by the group or by those above, either as a result
of creating too much disequilibrium or by not meeting
expectations of the group to bring equilibrium back to
the system.
DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM
The first and perhaps the most critical step in
the framework is properly diagnosing the problem
confronting the group. Dean Williams’s mentor Ron
Heifetz posits a very similar approach to leadership.
Heifetz’s model for determining the nature of the challenge helps clarify the nature of the challenge. He distinguishes between three types of problems that face
organization (see Figure 3-2). In each one, depending on the degree of complexity, different demands
are made on the authority figure and the group; as
the complexity increases, the requirement to exercise
adaptive leadership increases.
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Source: Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 1994, p. 76.17

Figure 3-2. Heifetz Table of Situation Types.
The leadership required to handle Type I challenges requires only technical solutions. These problems
are routine and the solutions are readily available.
Authority figures rely on their education, training,
and experience to solve the group’s challenges. When
confronted by Type II and III challenges, authority figures frequently find themselves at a fork in the road,
where one path leads to real leadership and the other
to counterfeit leadership. This is because authority
figures often insist on being the problem solver, providing a technical solution when in actuality, adaptive
solutions require the group to find the real solution.
For the U.S. military at the strategic level, the complexities of the problem set will always present Army
leaders with Type III challenges, requiring a more inclusive notion of leadership, as described by Williams
and Heifetz. Likewise, in the current operational environment (OE), our tactical-level leaders who used to
live in a Type I world of linear tactics, routine garri-
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son management, and personnel actions, now face the
complexity and ambiguity found in Type III problem
sets, which require different skill sets. Leaders without the skills to adapt, when presented with a Type II
or III problem, may default to counterfeit leadership.
They will choose the path of work avoidance mechanisms such as “holding onto past assumptions, blaming authority, scapegoating, externalizing the enemy,
denying the problems, jumping to conclusions, or
finding a distracting issue [that] may restore stability
and feel less stressful than facing and taking responsibility for a complex challenge.”18
Perhaps most dangerous is the charismatic figure
who employs work-avoidance mechanisms while reestablishing equilibrium in the system through persuasive and motivating rhetoric to help the organization avoid the reality of a changing environment.
Instead of generating creativity and responsibility,
charismatic authority can generate a mindless following or devolve into bureaucratic institutions that rely
on central planning and control. Creativity is stimulated by engaging with one’s environment, but the
skills of sensing local environments become dulled as
people fasten their gaze on the charismatic figure or
the chain of command for direction. Focused upward,
people lose touch with their communities, markets,
and personal resources.19

During the diagnostic process, the leader must
leave the “dance floor” (See Figure 3-1) and go up to
“the balcony” for a clearer perspective, through which
he can make an accurate and honest assessment of the
challenge confronting the organization.20 Once the
leader diagnoses the challenge as either a Type II or
Type III, the leader must assess the group’s prepared-
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ness, its ability to confront reality, and its willingness
to question assumptions and stimulate growth. After
this initial analysis, the leader designs an intervention
to move the group toward adaptive work (learning).
To do this effectively, the leader must accurately diagnose the domain, or nature, of the adaptive challenge. There are six domains suggested by Williams
in which most Type III (adaptive) challenges can be
categorized. Clearly diagnosing the nature of the
adaptive challenge will assist the leader in developing
a strategy to intervene and then manage the problemsolving process of the group. Williams’s six domains
of adaptive challenges include:
1. The activist challenge: Calling attention to a
contradiction in values;
2. The development challenge: Cultivating the latent capabilities needed to progress;
3. The transition challenge: Moving from one system of values to another;
4. The maintenance challenge: Protecting/sustaining what is essential during hard times;
5. The creative challenge: Doing what has never
been done before; and,
6. The crisis challenge: Leading in a period of extreme danger.21
When confronted by an activist challenge, the
leadership work is to provoke and evoke, to persuade
the group to face certain realities it would prefer to
avoid. The process includes both inspiring people
with a unifying purpose and calling attention to the
contradiction between what the group espouses and
what it actually does.22
When faced with a development challenge, the
leadership task should orchestrate a learning process
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through designed experimentation that cultivates the
group’s latent capabilities.23 To ensure the growth or
even survival of the organization, it must build new
capabilities, competencies, practices, and processes.24
Transition challenges emerge when some values and mindsets are no longer useful in addressing
challenges of the organization due to a shift in the dynamics of the environment or the emergence of a new
threat or opportunity. In this case, the leadership task
is to help the group refashion values, loyalties, and
mindsets.25
In a maintenance challenge, leading change is
not the focus; rather, the ability to protect essential
resources, maintain core values, and keep the enterprise from falling apart becomes the new preoccupation. Ignoring a threat to the group will not resolve the
issue; leaders must mobilize the group to overcome
dysfunctional practices and return to core values.26
When a group is confronted by what appears to be
an insurmountable barrier that best practices cannot
overcome, then it faces a creative challenge. Breaking the current paradigm and advancing to a new
one requires people to create.27 Unlike a development
challenge, a creative challenge requires a significant
break with the past and an unconstrained leap into the
future.28
The crisis challenge is an explosive situation in
which survival is at stake and urgent action is required. The group is under attack and its accrued
value is at risk.29 (A deeper and more thorough explanation of the principles in Williams’s new framework
for exercising leadership can be found in outline form
in Appendix I.)
The essence of leading in these complex domains is
the ability to remain flexible. Often adaptive challeng-
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es facing organizations will have elements of multiple
domains and require agility of mind and effort by the
leader to mobilize the group to address the reality of
the day. An organization can face multiple adaptive
challenges simultaneously, which further complicates
the already complex nature of the challenges faced by
the group.
General Odierno and the next generation of Army
leaders will continue to be faced with multiple adaptive challenges. General Dempsey’s intervention in
the form of the “Campaign of Learning” was, in and
of itself, a means to tackle the wide range of adaptive
challenges confronting the Army after a decade of
conflict and high operational tempo. Within this campaign, General Dempsey’s effort to reexamine what
it means to be a profession was and remains an essential maintenance challenge as the Army struggles
to balance and maintain core values. The doctrinal
shift from command and control to mission command
is an example of a transition challenge, and instituting a new conceptual foundation is a development
challenge. All the while, the potential of a crisis challenge looms in this complex and dangerous world.
However, it is leader development, which General
Dempsey identified as “job number one,” that continues to present the Army with its most important and
difficult adaptive challenge.30 Actually, however, the
nature of the challenge, because it will meet resistance
as a result of strongly held practices and assumptions,
makes it an activist challenge.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REAL WORK AHEAD
The tendency of any big bureaucracy is to revert to
business as usual at the first opportunity—for the military, that opportunity is, if not peacetime, the unwinding of sustained combat.1
		
		

— Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense
Speech at West Point, February 2011

The U.S. Army does many things right—its leaders
and Soldiers have fought and sacrificed valiantly in
service to the Nation; it cares for its wounded, honors
its dead, and supports its families. However, despite
its many successes, the U.S. Army can never be satisfied with the status quo. As a learning organization,
the Army must view self-improvement as a sacred
professional obligation. The profession of arms enjoys the trust and confidence of the American people
because it self-polices. As General Martin Dempsey
stated, “During the last 9 years of conflict, our Army
has shown itself to be both introspective about its performance and adaptive to the lessons it has learned.
Nevertheless, we want to formalize the effort to
learn.”2 Secretary Gates highlighted this impulse with
the observation that “the Army’s ability to adapt allowed it to pull Iraq from the brink of chaos in 2007,
and in 2010 roll back the Taliban in Afghanistan.” He
then quoted the words of General Peter Chiarelli, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army: “It is important that the
hard-fought lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not
merely ‘observed’ but truly ‘learned’—incorporated
into the service’s DNA.”3
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For the U.S. Army, the most pressing adaptive
challenge is overcoming the contradiction between
espoused values and actual behavior with regard to
Army leader development. We must revisit the work
in the center of the contradiction, “aligning and connecting our leader development programs and policies (basic underlying assumptions) with our conceptual foundation and doctrinal changes such as mission
command (espoused values).”4 This effort is the most
critical adaptation we can make within the Army’s
campaign of learning. This alignment is critical, because it is necessary in order to develop adaptive leaders, which are required to lead learning organizations.
At first glance, this proposed adaptation appears to be
in the transition domain. However, the fact is that this
complex challenge is rooted in an almost intractable
organizational culture whose nature demands a radical professional airing. Hence, we can accurately say
that the needed adaptation occupies the activist domain as well as the transitional: “The first challenge of
leadership [in an activist challenge] is to get people to
wake up to the fact there is a problem—that the group
is avoiding some aspect of reality, ignoring a threat, or
missing an opportunity.”5
There are thus times when leaders must take an
activist role in leading change—to get people to wake
up and face the problem or, in this case, to seize an
opportunity. As Williams states, “Often the problem
is embedded in the people’s values and behavior. People might espouse one view but act in ways that are
not consistent with that view. The leadership task in
an activist challenge is to call attention to the contradiction in values and intervene to disrupt the thinking
and patterns of behavior that allow the people to persist in avoiding the reality of their condition.”6
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Symptoms of an activist challenge for any group
include:
•	“Some enduring behaviors, values, and/or practices have become corrosive and dysfunctional and
serve to undermine the long-term integrity and
survival of the group.
•	An opportunity presents itself that can lead to
great benefit and progress for the group, but no
one is seriously considering it.
•	Danger is looming due to an internal or external threat, and the group is not doing anything
about it”7 (Italics added by the author).
In diagnosing an activist challenge, the leader
must examine the condition of the people facing the
challenge, the barrier that impedes progress, and the
promise or aspiration on the other side of the barrier.
Generally speaking, the people are unwilling to change
their values or thinking to accommodate some aspect of reality.8 The people are in denial, resistant to
change, and comfortable where they are. The barrier
in an activist challenge is the people’s resistance. Individual thinking is trapped by the prevailing group
paradigm.9 The promise is that if people can face the
problem and seriously consider the data that they
have neglected or denied, then a new opportunity
for progress can open. In these cases, fundamentally,
the leader wants people to learn, to learn about the
problem, to learn how they contribute to the problem, and
what can be done to solve the problem.10 This learning
may mean swimming upstream against the current of
organizational culture. Or, to switch metaphors, the
leader must “burrow down into people’s underlying
assumptions and deeply held beliefs to ascertain why
the problem persists and what can be done about it.”11
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As the Army reflects on the state of the profession today, it is clear that certain behaviors and practices inside the organization have become corrosive
and dysfunctional and could potentially undermine
the long-term integrity of the profession. General
Dempsey identified reality, the dangers confronting
the profession internally and externally in the operational environment (OE). His intervention was manifested in the Army’s “Campaign of Learning,” which
challenged its members to use their imaginations
to improve the profession. During the campaign of
learning, there is opportunity for institutional growth
and for real change to move the organization forward.
Is the group ready for the adaptive work? Is the profession ready to face the reality that it must abandon
some of its subconscious insistence on control and stability, that it must push boundaries in order to implement changes that will cause disequilibrium and rock
the boat? Is it prepared for the discomfort of having its
basic underlying assumptions questioned and challenged in an effort to achieve cultural adaptation? As
Dr. James Pierce stated, “A real culture change will
require a substantial reengineering of the way we do
business . . . for example, making our vocation a true
life-long profession, and, of course, a complete overhaul of the evaluation and promotion system.”12 As
we recall from an earlier chapter, Dr. Pierce’s study
indicates that the promotion system may itself be the
source of a toxic competitive culture.
POTENTIAL BARRIERS
Ironically, the greatest barrier to the Army’s adaptive work is the leaders in the organization itself, specifically, the field grade officers who have the greatest
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impact on the day-to-day operations of organizations
and the greatest influence on the mentorship and
molding of the junior leaders in the organization. It is
the power of organizational culture and its resistance
to change that will challenge these leaders to fully embrace the adaptations required to alter how the Army
fundamentally does business. Field grade officers,
primarily majors and lieutenant colonels with 10-20
years of service, are both fully immersed in and committed to the Army culture and remain professionally
competitive as they strive to embody the professional
ideals and compete for senior command selection.
This combination of cultural influence and professional competitiveness makes them vulnerable to risk
aversion and work avoidance with regard to the effort
associated with adaptation.
What Williams describes as work avoidance—a
response to disequilibrium in which individuals or
groups eschew work that challenges their values or
beliefs13—will manifest itself through these leaders.
The campaign of learning threatens some deeply held
beliefs, conscious and subconscious, causing pushback against the learning process. Leaders will find
“more pressing” issues to occupy their time rather
than deal with the real work at hand. The leadership
challenge is to get people to confront the gap between
their aspiration (growing adaptive leaders) and what
they are willing to contribute or sacrifice in order to
fulfill that aspiration (willingness to take prudent risk,
to make oneself vulnerable in decentralized operations, to allow junior leaders to develop by underwriting mistakes made by subordinates in the name of
experimentation and learning).14
In a “get the job done” culture, leaders unwilling to
risk failure will employ work-avoidance mechanisms
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that will subvert the institutional adaptations sought
in the campaign of learning. Indicators that leaders are
avoiding adaptive work include: leaders who doggedly hold onto outdated assumptions to remain in their
comfort zone, leaders who lead through dominance
and control, leaders who repeatedly assign provably
bankrupt tasks to the group and get them to follow,
and leaders who look up the chain of command for
solutions.15
The greatest pitfall in the get-it-done culture is for
the members of the organization to look to its authority figures to provide the solutions. Unfortunately,
many will look to General Odierno and other senior
leaders for the answers to the challenges, to sate their
hunger, and to cure their ailments. As the heat goes
up with the introduction of disequilibrium, those
less adaptive will look to senior leaders (authority) to
provide simple answers that will bring equilibrium
back to the system—but will also snuff out learning,
change, and required adaptation. They will look to the
senior leaders’ wisdom to provide solutions, when,
as Williams states, real leadership wisdom “requires
pursuing truth with fervor and passion, being sensitive to the context in which the problem resides, and
holding the question in each context, ‘What will make
our work worthwhile—to our lives and the lives of
others?’”16 Moreover, the real leadership wisdom that
Williams advocates is not that of an all-knowing divine; it is the wisdom to “discern which values to promote and protect, and which values should be challenged or changed.”17 The adaptive work, however, is
the responsibility of the entire group; it is for all the
members of the profession to engage the uncertainty,
to be creative and come up with innovative solutions
to align values with practice.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the present superior comparative strength
in U.S. military capabilities, a failure of imagination
and inability to achieve operational adaptability could
become the U.S. Army’s Achilles heel. The Army’s
true strength must become its intellectual approach
to future conflict, where the Army not only has the
ability to out-fight the enemy, but to out-think him,
to adapt faster and maintain the initiative. During an
address at the Joint Warfare Staff College in February
2010, Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, Special Operations Command, stated it most succinctly, “We are
not going to fight our way out of these conflicts; we
are going to have to think our way out.”18
Authority, like command, is bestowed upon an individual to maintain order and accountability. Leadership in any given instance offers a choice. It invites
potential leaders to assume responsibility. As members of a profession, officers collectively must ensure
that the entire organization assumes its responsibility
and makes the choice to create learning organizations.
These organizations, led by leaders who exercise
real adaptive leadership, will ensure that the Army
achieves operational adaptability to promote peace or,
when called on, to win the Nation’s wars.
The Army’s “Campaign of Learning” sets conditions for a continuum of learning across the Army that
will result in a paradigm shift in the approach to institutional adaptation.19 Using a more holistic approach
to adaptive leadership through frameworks like the
one presented by Dean Williams, and confronting the
contradictions in the professional culture, are essential to the Army’s ability to adapt, which is “an institutional imperative.”20 General Paul Gorman, Com-
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mander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command from 1983
to 1985, once said that doctrine and training will prepare us for what lies ahead only if “forceful effective
ideas on how to fight pervade the force.”21 The Army is
fighting effectively today in Iraq and Afghanistan—
decentralized, allowing commanders to use discretion
and take initiative. However, as General Dempsey has
said, “These principles have not yet been made institutional in our doctrine and in our training.” As such,
they do not pervade the force, nor our culture. “Until
they do—until they drive our leader development . . .
we [the Army] cannot consider ourselves ready, and
we should not consider ourselves sufficiently adaptable.”22
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APPENDIX I
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR LEADERSHIP
Dean Williams
Center for Public Leadership
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
What Does it Mean to be a Leader?
1. Leadership is the activity of mobilizing people
to confront and address problematic realities, engage in
learning, and create what is needed to improve the human condition or make things better.
2. For every group, there are practices or problems (internal or external) that are impediments to
progress. These impediments are adaptive challenges
that must be productively resolved for the group to
advance. To successfully address an impediment, the
exercise of leadership is needed to design and orchestrate a series of experiments to discover what works
or what is missing and what must be modified in the
group’s values, practices and priorities.
3. Our notion of leadership is significantly different from traditional notions of leadership, which overemphasize the practices of “giving people answers,”
“gaining followers,” “showing the way forward,” and
“getting people to do what you want them to do.” Of
course, there are times when giving answers, showing the way forward, and motivating people are important, but the essence of adaptive leadership is in
giving the problem-solving work back to the people
by getting them to face reality, learn, discover, solve
problems, and take responsibility for the work they
must do to generate real progress.
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4. We distinguish leadership from authority. Most
people collapse the two, believing they are the same.
We say that authority is a position or function in a
group, while leadership is an activity that can be done
with or without authority.
5. Authority generally supports the implementation of technical work while leadership orchestrates the
process of adaptive work—a process in which groups
modify their thinking and values and make significant adjustments in their behavior to accommodate
the reality of a changed context produced by threats
and dangers or the emergence of new opportunities
and possibilities. Technical problem-solving generally
does not require a shift in how people think and behave, while adaptive problem solving does.
6. All systems (groups and institutions) must
strengthen their adaptive capacity in order to survive.
Evolution is the natural process for unfolding the
adaptive capacity of an entity or a system. But the evolutionary process takes a long time and is also inefficient and deficient, because it generates too many losers, produces too much waste, and promotes survival
of the fittest. Since the evolutionary process takes too
long, systems often die off or collapse because they
cannot generate a successful adaptive response to cope
with changed conditions fast enough. Leadership is
the process of intervening in the system to “punctuate
the equilibrium” or “disturb the drift” of the group
in order to stimulate problem-solving and change at a
faster rate than evolution provides.
7. The intervention process of leadership gets people to attend to what is flawed, broken, or deficient
in their thinking, values, norms, or shared patterns of
operation. It seeks to put enough reality in the lap of
the group so that threats can be acknowledged, flaws
fixed, change pursued, and progress generated.
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8. Progress, according to the dictionary, means a
move toward a “higher or better state.”
9. Within any human, organizational, social, political, or economic system, there may be differences of
opinion about what is meant by “higher” or “better.”
Therefore, the first adaptive challenge of leadership
will be to work with the group to generate a shared
perspective on higher and better that takes into consideration the reality of the group’s context, the people’s aspirations, and the threats and opportunities
before the group.
10. The notion of progress—or what it means to
move toward higher and better—should be subject to
testing by many factions so that it does not become a
narrow agenda of a single faction, and thereby lead to
the alienation, attack, or harm of others. Testing what
progress means to a group on an ongoing basis should
include demanding ethical and moral standards and
considerations to ensure that short-term, parochial
self-interest does not override the sustainable wellbeing of the whole, as happened with the U.S. banking
system and contributed to the recent financial crisis.
11. The key driver of progress lies in increasing the
system’s capacity to solve complex problems faster so
that a successful adaptation in the system will result—
thus minimizing the danger and threat to the system
and ensuring it has the capacity to deliver on its promise.
12. Movement toward a higher or better stage by
any group requires added investment in time, resources, and energy, and an increase in coordinated effort
to generate values, practices, systems, and structures
that can produce enough adaptive work so progress
unfolds with minimal waste and casualties.
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13. This process of producing progress through
adaptive work requires examining the prevailing assumptions and deep beliefs people hold concerning
key human pursuits. For example, the prevailing belief among many groups is that democracy and the
free market are the vehicles to get to higher and better.
Another belief is that military interventions on behalf
of national interests or the replacement of one regime
with another can lead to higher and better. But, as
we have discovered through the financial meltdown
in the United States and elsewhere, democracy and a
free market without enlightened rules, or indiscriminate strategic military interventions, cannot produce
spontaneously or by design enough of the progress
that the 21st century will require for survival of the
valuable parts of civilization.
14. Therefore, it is imperative that leadership be
exercised to orchestrate adaptations that produce
enough learning, problem-solving, and discoveries in
groups to fix deficiencies and faults in human theories, plans of actions, implementation strategies, and
coordination mechanisms between factions so that
genuine progress eventuates.
Diagnostic Work, Social Learning, and Adaptive
Work.
1. Given the threats and dangers in an ever-changing world, complex and challenging problems exist
for all institutions, groups, organizations, and societies that expose weaknesses and deficiencies in any
human system. We call these problems adaptive challenges.
2. There are different kinds of challenges for every
group. The kind of challenge the people face should
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be determined by what’s at stake if the people persist
in their current course. In other words, what are the
threats to the system that necessitate people to modify
some aspect of their habits, thinking, or priorities?
3. There is an activist challenge—getting people to
face and consider something they have been refusing
to face or consider; a development challenge—bringing forth latent capabilities in order to respond to the
threats and take advantage of opportunities; a transition challenge—shifting the values of the group from
one set to another; a maintenance challenge—preserving essential parts of group values in the face of peril
or threat; a creative challenge—doing something that
has never been done before; and a crisis challenge—attending to ticking time-bombs that threaten to destroy
much of the value that has been amassed.
4. Leadership begins with thorough diagnostic
work to discover the essence of the adaptive challenge
facing the group. However, with tough problematic
realities and demanding adaptive challenges, it is not
always easy to frame them or put labels on them in
a way that is accurate or useful. Often what we describe as the problem is nothing more than a symptom. Adaptive problems are usually messes that are
extremely complex and systemic in nature and require
a significant degree of diagnostic work to figure out
the real issues and the values that perpetuate them.
5. The diagnostic of leadership seeks to help people, according to Plato, distinguish essence from appearance and shadows from reality. In other words,
leadership seeks to take a group beyond surface phenomena, myth, and superstition (anything believed to
be true that is not) and facilitate a deeper learning pertaining to the assumptions, beliefs, and values people
hold with regard to their condition and interpretation
of reality.
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6. In doing good diagnosis, a leader might ask: 1)
What are the internal and external dangers and threats
to the system? 2) Do people see and agree on these
dangers and threats? 3) How do people interpret the
reasons for these dangers and threats? and 4) What
values, mindsets, and priorities need to be promoted,
changed, discarded or modified in order to address
the challenge?
7. There are different kinds of problems facing any
group. There are adaptive problems that the people
have failed to anticipate because they have no prior
experience and therefore do not recognize the phenomenon that indicates danger is in their midst or on
the horizon.
8. There are adaptive problems that people recognize but are complacent in addressing because they
feel that to take steps to address the problem would
require too much of a sacrifice in the present.
9. There are also adaptive problems that people
recognize, but their interpretations are incomplete or
biased, and they impute blame to others and fail to
acknowledge that their own values and priorities are
also contributing to the problem.
10. Diagnostic work must consider the systemic
dynamics that surround and perpetuate an adaptive
problem, because often a problematic concern resides
in the relationship of the various factions. In other
words, there is something deficient or maladaptive
in the relationship between the factions that serves to
threaten the whole. The framing of the adaptive challenge must therefore include the relationship of the
factions.
11. Therefore, a primary function of leadership, in
the context of an adaptive challenge, is to diagnose: 1)
what the factions are; 2) how the different factions in-
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terpret the challenge; 3) how each faction contributes
to the problem; and, 4) what values and practices in
the relationship between the factions perpetuate the
problem.
12. In doing diagnostic work, the leader might ask,
“What is unresolved, that if it was resolved, would
make a difference for the system? Another important
diagnostic question is: “What values do the people
hold that they consider more important than facing
the problem or making genuine progress?” These
questions point at the work-avoidance dynamics in
the system and help explain the reasons for the work
avoidance.
13. An important facet of diagnostic work is to
generate learning and discoveries about the system
and the adaptive challenge through experimentation.
Discoveries about the reality of the challenge or the
group predicament can only unfold and be sustained
when deep social learning takes place. Social learning
and institutional learning require multiple groups and
factions to engage the competing perspectives of the
other to enrich their understanding of their condition.
14. To orchestrate a deep social learning, there
generally must be some perturbance to the system to
generate enough disequilibrium that allows for high
levels of engagement of competing perspectives. The
disequilibrium produces tension as people wrestle
with what is essential and what is expendable. It is
a conflictual process associated with the discord and
the pain associated with a group seeking to make adjustments in their habits and practices and deal with
the losses that must be sustained if they are to move
forward.
15. Social learning (change, transition, and development) must be a carefully paced process. As Plato’s
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analogy of the Cave illustrates, you cannot overwhelm
the group, or it will turn against you. Helping people
sustain losses or let go of maladaptive practices, values, and perspectives is an essential part of the learning process and requires sensitivity, pacing, and a
large dose of compassion.
Group Dynamics and Social Systems.
1. Leadership is more than getting a single group
or team performing better. It generally requires intervening in a complex system of varying factions and
interests. To exercise leadership, one must have an appreciation for the systemic dynamics, which include
the unconscious forces that shape and influence the
behavior of the individual parts and the collective
whole. Groups, organizations, communities, and nations are more than the sum of the individual parts
and have a life of their own. They are social systems
with multiple interacting components that affect each
and every part.
2. As it pertains to a tough leadership challenge,
the leadership task is to figure out how individuals act
out factional values, loyalties, unresolved concerns,
and fantasies, and perpetuate the situation of irresolution. Rather than conduct a psychological analysis of
the individuals to figure out why something is broken
or not functioning effectively, a leader seeks to understand the forces in the background that shape and
move the individuals who are in the foreground.
3. Groups are not particularly rational entities.
More often than not they are inherently irrational—
that is, all manner of unconscious sentiments are
swirling beneath the surface that impact the flow of
the group dynamic and the people’s capacity to ad-
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dress problematic realities. These unconscious sentiments generate work avoidance mechanisms such as
scapegoating deviants, attack on the authority, displacement of responsibility, and the generation of decoy issues and false tasks.
4. Leadership interventions must address not just
the individual but the system and the factional dynamics of the system if progress is to be made and sustained. The preoccupation with personalities and individual psychology without diagnosing the systemic
dynamics is incomplete and limited in usefulness.
5. Leaders must consider what part of the system
needs to make adjustments in values or perspectives
to deal with the threat, danger, or opportunity. But
in addressing the part of the system that is deficient,
they must also consider interdependence of the various parts and how each part impacts the whole.
6. Individual analysis as it pertains to an adaptive
challenge should be about the roles people play in the
system. People play roles and are generally unconscious of the fact they are playing a role. A role is a
group construct.
7. A role is a consistent and persistent pattern of
behavior and response that serves a particular purpose for the group. We may consciously try to change
our role and succeed, but that is an adaptive challenge
in and of itself. But the power of a system is such that
it can hold us in a particular place, or use us in a particular way, so that we have little room to maneuver.
In other words, there are patterns and dynamics in
the relationship between the individual and the group
that reinforce certain behaviors that make it difficult
for individuals to change, even should they so desire.
While roles can be constraining, they can also be a resource that allows us to make interventions or support
others in the doing of adaptive work.
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8. Anyone attempting to exercise leadership should
seriously reflect on whether their role is being used
by the group for work avoidance, distancing from
responsibility, feeding group hungers, and putting a
false set of tasks before the group—rather than engaging the difficult work of progress.
9. It is important to distinguish between self and
role. A role is something that we take up or have imposed upon us. But the role is not us. The moment one
collapses the role with self, the ability to think clearly
and exercise leadership is significantly reduced. Often, when people attack the leader or get upset with
the boss or one becomes a lightning rod for a particular issue, it is because that person embodies the issue
for the group. It is important not to take the attack
personally. Likewise, when the group applauds and
adores the leader, one should not be seduced or succumb to the excessive longings of the people to solve
their problems for them and produce the magic solution.
Authority
1. Authority is a very ancient and important orienting function for any group, be it a family, school,
club, community, or nation. But the authority role is
difficult when competing factions have varied expectations and hungers that they demand the authority
figure to respond to or sate.
2. Some of the basic expectations of any group include the provision of means to obtain fundamental
necessities, protect boundaries, control conflict, maintain the norms for the group, and advance its interests.
3. Groups also look to the authority figure to embody the “mantle of the ideal.” Such figures are ex-
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pected to display the values and practices that are
meaningful to the people.
4. Failure to fulfill people’s expectations, feed
enough of their hungers, or be the mantle of the ideal
can lead to the de-authorization of the authority figure.
5. Authority figures are often used by the people
to avoid confronting the real work of progress. Some
groups constantly replace their authority figures, but
things do not get any better. The authority figure simply is an extension of themselves.
6. The ways people use authority to avoid real
work include: 1) the tendency to want the authority to
be a magician and fix everything; 2) excessive dependence on or deference to the authority with the hope
that the authority will make their life easier or bestow
benefits (status and rewards) on them for their loyalty;
and, 3) unnecessarily, even irrationally, fighting with
or undermining the authority because the person is
seen as an impediment or a threat by virtue of their
position or dominance.
7. While authority can be a massive work-avoidance issue for a group, its function can also be used
productively to promote adaptive work. Authority
should be used to formulate a holding environment to
contain the group’s work-avoidance patterns, which
are inevitable when dealing with tough problems.
A holding environment consists of the set of values,
rules, norms and boundaries that hold the group in
their conflicts and problem-solving pursuits.
8. While a tight holding environment can promote
group identity, it can also limit the creativity needed
to produce adaptive solutions. Authority plays an important role in strengthening or loosening the holding
environment depending on what challenge the people

119

face and the amount of creativity and conflict that is
needed to produce a solution.
9. Because people look to authorities for guidance
and answers, it is very seductive for authorities to act
like they know where they are going when they do not
and to feed the people’s hungers when they should
be feeding themselves. This can be dangerous, as it
promotes dependence and delusions. The challenge
of authority figures is to use their authority to direct
people’s attention to aspects of reality that people are
avoiding or refuse to contend with, and call attention
to the contradiction in values between what people
espouse and how they behave, even when it is painful
for the people.
10. Authority often serves as a repository for people’s hopes, fears, aspirations, and pain. This can be
a heavy burden for the authority figure. The authority figure, in the exercise of leadership, must seek to
give enough of the burden of responsibility back to
the people at a rate they can tolerate.
11. Authority can also promote learning and adaptive work by protecting the deviant voices in the system that others seek to block.
Intervention.
1. The essence of leadership is in intervention to direct attention to a problematic concern. This is always
difficult, as people have so many other concerns competing for their attention. Leadership interventions
must be creative in order to get and hold attention.
2. A creative intervention necessitates stepping beyond the normal way of speaking and listening and
ensuring that timing, pacing, voice modulation, and
partnering are features of the intervention process.
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3. A leadership intervention is a “perturbing force”
that stirs the group to confront an issue that they have
been avoiding or to pursue a course of action that they
have been reluctant to pursue.
4. Perturbing can be done through provoking and
evoking. A provocative intervention stirs the group
into action by generating dissonance. An evocative intervention stirs people to action by appealing to higher
values or noble sentiment. Excessive provocation can
lead to rebellion, and excessive evoking can generate
group dependency. Leadership interventions should
use multiple means to stir the group. Doing the same
thing all the time will reduce the potency of the interventions.
5. In order to intervene, one must be able to understand the difference between holding steady and
holding back. Holding steady is being in a state of
engagement and watching to see how the group is responding, while holding back is a defense mechanism
that distances oneself from responsibility for contributing.
6. Successful interventions need partners to help
orchestrate the intervention. It is dangerous to lead
alone. Partners help to keep the attention on the problem. They clarify issues. They highlight the leader’s
blind spots and provide feedback with regard to what
is working or not working.
7. A leader must develop the capacity to make spontaneous and improvised interventions, and planned,
designed, and highly strategic interventions. All are
needed, since leadership interventions must deal with
the long-term challenges of mobilizing people to do
adaptive work and the day-to-day challenges of sustaining attention, maintaining levels of engagement,
and minimizing distractions. Adaptive work by its
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very nature unfolds in a dynamic and unpredictable
manner.
8. Not all adaptive problems are clearly framed or
obvious to the people. Therefore, interventions should
be used to ripen issues so that the problem steadily
builds a constituency for engagement.
Creativity and Leadership.
1. It might be said that there can be no leadership
without creativity. Generally there can be no adaptive
work without creative problem-solving. Creativity is
the engine of progress. Adaptive work necessitates
pushing boundaries and frontiers through creative
exploration. Creativity is needed because the solution
for a difficult adaptive challenge may lie outside the
current repertoire of responses.
2. Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, says that group knowledge exists within a
paradigm—a shared set of myths, beliefs, and assumptions. Leadership prods and pokes at the myths,
beliefs, and assumptions of the group to see if the paradigm should be broadened, modified, or abandoned.
3. Creative leadership requires the courage to challenge a prevailing myth, norm, practice, or value. It
requires courage because challenging the group might
be threatening to a group that is rigidly attached to
its paradigm, a source of comfort and security to the
group.
4. Creative adaptations in the group, organization,
or community generally occur in a state of tension or
conflict. Rollo May argues that conflict is an inherent
part of the creative process and generates the sparks
that ignite the consideration and exploration of alternatives and unconsidered propositions.
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5. The conflict associated with the creative process is the product of competing values and perspectives rubbing up (even clashing) against each other.
Through this engagement process, the spark of new
insights and possibilities can emerge. Authority, however, must manage the disequilibrium associated with
the creative process to ensure that it does not turn
destructive. Indeed, creative work can be terrifying
for people and lead them to flee, scapegoat a faction,
or even kill the leader. Rollo May says that creativity
provokes the jealousy of the gods!
Assassination and the Challenge of Staying Alive.
1. Leadership can be dangerous, as you are often
on the razor’s edge or in a vulnerable space. Groups
neutralize leaders and authority figures who challenge
prevailing wisdom by assassinating them, undermining them, marginalizing them, or overthrowing them.
Dissident voices, who provide some leadership without any authority and challenge the group by calling
attention to the group’s hypocrisy, can also be attacked, marginalized, or silenced.
2. All groups have mechanisms for neutralizing
the provocative voice or the unacceptable authority
figure.
3. Dissident and provocative voices that are moving the group toward important aspects of reality
should be protected and partnered with to ensure that
they are not killed off, and that the issue they represent remains alive.
4. The leadership challenge is to keep the issue on
the table and yourself off the table. You want people
dissecting the issue and not dissecting you.
5. Do not be a martyr or encourage martyrdom
in others. Martyrs are often used by groups to avoid
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the real work. They perpetuate an “us versus them”
dynamic, encourage delusionary and grandiose thinking, and promote counterproductive battles that persist.
6. To minimize the risk of assassination, have partners and confidants to protect you. Also, pace the
work. Do not become a self-righteous crusader who
seeks to impose your plan upon others. While a group
can hold terrible views and engage in negative practices, it is necessary for the leader to have a degree of
sensitivity and understanding as to how those views
and practices came into existence.
7. It is important for those in the role of lightning
rod to distinguish between attacks that are acts of
sabotage or neutralization and the attacks that are
inevitable on an important issue with which people
are struggling. As a lightning rod, one must be able
to hold steady and ascertain the deeper concerns and
fears that are underlying the attack.
Purpose, Task and Work Avoidance.
1. Leaders need a compelling sense of purpose to
hold them as they pursue the exercise of leadership.
2. Purpose is a place to come from rather than a destination to get to. It shapes your relationship to the
problem. It generates a way of being with the problem.
3. Purpose serves as a holding environment for the
leader and the group when doing adaptive work. It
holds your doubts and your aspirations. It keeps you
in the game. It gives you reason to intervene and challenge. It also gives you reason to learn and be curious.
4. Purpose must be self-generated and not imposed. There is no purpose beyond what you or the
people generate.
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5. Maintaining a sense of purpose is essential to
keep the people from fleeing or succumbing to their
hungers. Purpose puts something at stake. It puts fire
in the belly.
6. All groups have work-avoidance mechanisms
that they employ to distance themselves from responsibility for their real problems—this is because their
sense of purpose is very weak, insufficiently constructed, or connected to the perpetuation of their identity.
7. Excessive work avoidance might produce a state
of purposelessness or narrowly defined self-interest
that leads people to act irresponsibly and endanger
themselves and their community. The goal of leadership is to work with the group to generate a sense of
purpose and get connected to a worthwhile and noble
aspiration—not necessarily a vision (a place to get to)
but an aspiration (something to live and work for).
8. Work-avoidance mechanisms include any group
activity that leads people away from the engagement
of a problematic reality—such as fighting; competing
for resources or status; succumbing to one’s hungers;
politicking; fleeing from responsibility; disengagement; the generation of false visions and delusions;
and the pursuit of false tasks that seem momentarily
attractive but really have nothing to do with sustainable progress.
9. A leader must be willing to tolerate a degree of
work avoidance in the system (it is inevitable), in the
same way that wise parents will tolerate a degree of
work avoidance in their teenage child as the child engages in the developmental process of transitioning
into adulthood. No group goes straight to the problem, but generally it goes around in circles for some
time. This can be an important learning process that
occurs in a state of disequilibrium and allows for discoveries to be made.
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10. It is important to distinguish exercising leadership with a sense of purpose from crusading. Crusading is the thoughtless pursuit of a goal. Crusaders,
although extremely committed, can do tremendous
damage. Rather than engaging in learning and maintaining an attitude of curiosity, they hold onto a dogma as a truth. Leadership promotes thinking, a thinking that allows for more effective action in the face of
complex problems.
Listening and Leadership.
1. If one cannot listen, one cannot exercise leadership. So much of leadership work is about listening.
2. Listening allows one to access the sentiment of
the group and its respective factions, and to hear the
people’s fear, pain, and despair—and their hopes,
dreams, and desires.
3. There is no such thing as empty listening. Our
listening is heavily warped and distorted with assessments and judgments as we listen from a particular
position or from the tuning of our harp strings (the
significant voices in our heads).
4. To exercise successful leadership effectively,
one must have a degree of self-knowledge or a willingness to pursue such knowledge. In order to build
self-knowledge, one must inquire into how one listens
to access reality. Consider the following questions:
a. Where do I listen from (my assumptions, my
positions, my loyalties)?
b. Whom do I listen to? (What people or factions do I consider worthwhile, and whom do I discount? Do I listen to the voices on the margins? Can I
really listen to my enemy?)
c. What do I listen for? (We often listen for
agreement, acknowledgment, acceptance, or to feed
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our hungers, whatever they might be. In the exercise
of leadership one has to listen for “what’s missing” in
the group, the sentiment of the group, and the music
beneath the words).
5. The challenge of leadership is to deepen and
broaden your listening capacity. In the class, the music occasionally played is used as a metaphor for the
challenge of listening to sounds that do not fit neatly
into our paradigm. How difficult it is to give undivided attention and listen and hear the meaning and
sentiment that is imbedded in the sounds, as quaint as
they might be.
6. The challenge of leadership is to also to listen to
the deviant voice, the individual or faction that is trying to raise an issue or concern that is in opposition to
the prevailing view. A deviant can easily be killed off
and marginalized. Authority figures should protect
the deviant voice, and the leadership work is to tackle
the concern the deviant is raising and not to tackle the
deviant.
7. The challenge of leadership is to listen to your
enemies—to really hear their concerns and what is
driving their opposition.
8. The challenge of leadership is to listen to voices
on the margins. Who is being pushed to the side and
why? What perspectives do they embody that the
larger group is having difficulty incorporating?
9. The challenge of leadership is to listen to the
frontline. Can you really hear the concerns, fears, advice, and perspectives of those on the frontline who
are fighting the battles, interacting with customers, or
doing the real implementation work?
10. The challenge of leadership is to listen to confidants and allies who can talk straight and tell you
when you are being a jerk or causing an unnecessary
mess.
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Inspiration and Leadership.
1. Groups need inspiration to face demanding
challenges. Inspiration is about breathing life into the
group. Inspiration is needed to keep people engaged
in the work, particularly when one is tired and finds it
difficult to persist. Inspiration can serve to “keep the
fire burning” and to keep people focused on the work
that matters, particularly when the people are tired
and seek to flee.
2. It is difficult to be inspirational when one is being excessively technical about the work or stuck in a
particular role.
3. Inspiration can be used to shift people’s relationship to an issue, concern, or challenge. It can help
them see what is at stake in a way that connects their
own values to noble aspirations.
4. Inspiration serves to remind people of what is
possible. Inspiration speaks to higher sentiments, the
“divine spark” and the “noble” side of people. The
dark side is often exploited by counterfeit leaders to
stir people into a state of vengeance or to promote a
false sense of security.
5. Leaders must take responsibility for how they
employ and deploy inspiration. Inspiration can be
a dangerous tool. It can be used to perpetuate work
avoidance in a social system by generating false hope,
by putting faith in decoy issues, or by inspiring people
to scapegoat others and to avoid taking responsibility
for their condition.
6. Inspiration can also lead to excessive dependency on the authority figure or one exercising leadership. The people might call the leader charismatic and
project onto him or her some magical quality, thereby
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diminishing their own capacity and responsibility for
doing adaptive work and exercising creativity in the
face of difficult problems.
7. According to the Odin myth, the gift of poetic
inspiration was the most important gift of the gods,
and therefore the dwarfs and giants were constantly
fighting to steal the sacred mead (potion) that gave
access to the gift. Whoever had the mead had the ultimate power over the people to do with them as they
wanted! The abuse of the mead, as we see in the Odin
myth, may lead to the destruction of all.
8. Inspiration must be connected to aspiration. Inspiration breathes life into the group, while aspiration
is breathing out, or taking steps toward the desired
purpose.
9. To provide genuine inspiration, the leader must
tap into one’s personal bank of pain, joy, and experience and connect it to the reality of where the people
are. In other words, there must be an authentic connection between the leader and the group, a connection that transcends the despair of the moment and
creates a window of possibility for the group.
Personal Work of Leadership.
1. To exercise leadership, one must be like the
Norse god Odin and have a process for increasing in
wisdom and understanding in order to minimize the
damage your power might cause and maximize the
effectiveness of your interventions.
2. Use partners to detect what is missing due
to your blind spots. A leader must ask, “How am I
wrapped up in this problem in ways that I don’t see?”
Partners can help answer that question.
3. Detect when you are leading by crusading. It
is easy to become excessively passionate and single129

minded about the rightness of your pursuit, failing to
see other options and alternatives and to make adjustments in your assumptions, strategies, and actions.
Crusaders become obnoxious about their cause and
provide no room for serious adaptive work.
4. Detect when your narcissism is getting in the
way. Many people who enter the political arena or
seek to lead with authority have narcissistic tendencies. This is not necessarily bad. Narcissism is the
feeling of self-importance and the exaggeration of
your value and contribution. Leaders must always be
watching to ensure their narcissism does not get in the
way of the real work. Excessive narcissism produces
counterfeit leadership because the spotlight falls on
the person and not the problem.
5. Detect when your convictions are getting in the
way of your capacity for accurate diagnosis. We all
have beliefs, desires, and convictions that frame our
view of the world. In doing thorough diagnostic work,
it may be necessary to put our convictions to the side
in order to listen, observe and distinguish what really
is going on.
6. Detect when your hungers are getting in the way.
Hungers are desires that we seek to fulfill in the course
of our normal pursuits. It is easy for our hungers to
distract us from exercising leadership and thereby
sabotage our capacity to make a serious contribution.
Hungers include the desire for status, prominence,
dominance, control, territory, acceptance, adoration,
etc.
7. Detect when your factional loyalties are impeding the doing of adaptive work. We all have attachments to family, friends, communities, and nations.
Our loyalties to our respective factions can often lead
us to not challenge our own group or to disappoint
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them. If our attachment is too strong, we may promote
tribalism at the expense of progress.
8. Detect the people’s reality; stay grounded, and
wander. You must be able to find out what is really
going on in the system. This will require taking off the
robes of authority, leaving one’s hallowed office, and
going out among the people to sense for yourself what
is really happening without any filter.
9. Detect when to move to the side or get out of the
way. Sometimes the work of leadership is to get out of
the way and go home. In other words, there is nothing
more that you can do, and if you persist in staying
connected to the challenge, your presence will impede
progress. It might be time to get lost and let someone
else take over.
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APPENDIX III
RECOMMENDED CHANGES
TO LEADER CORE COMPETENCIES
OUTLINED IN THE
ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY,
NOVEMBER 2009
Leader Core Competencies extract from the Army
Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), with recommended additions.
LEADER CORE COMPETENCIES
Army leaders apply their character, presence, and
intellect in leading our nation’s Soldiers. The expectations for what leaders should do regardless of the
situation are captured in the Army’s core leader competencies. Core leader competencies are defined as
groups of related behaviors that lead to successful performance common throughout the organization and
are consistent with the organization’s values. There
are eight leader competencies that fall into four areas:
One who leads. Provides vision through purpose,
motivation, universal respect, and direction to guide
others. Extends one’s influence beyond the chain of
command to build partnerships and alliances to accomplish complex work. Leading is conveyed by communicating (imparting ideas) and setting the example.
One who develops. Leads organizations by creating and maintaining a positive environment and by
investing effort in their broadening, and that of others,
to achieve depth and breadth. Developing includes assessing needs to improve self, others, and the organization.
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One who achieves. Focuses on what needs to be
accomplished. Has an expeditionary mindset and can
adapt to unanticipated, changing, and uncertain situations. Achieving in the short term is about getting results but in the long term, it is about setting the vision
to obtain objectives.
One who mobilizes. Navigates organizations
through adaptive challenges by confronting people
with the reality of changed conditions. Provides a
learning environment for the group to discover and
develop adaptive solutions.
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